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Sammendrag 
I denne artikkelen kvantifiseres betydningen og omfanget av ufullkommen konkurranse i det 
amerikanske arbeidsmarkedet ved å estimere størrelsen på monopolprofitten som bedrifter og 
arbeidstakere tjener på løpende ansettelsesforhold. For dette formålet benytter vi administrative data 
med skatteopplysninger for samtlige amerikanske virksomheter og arbeidstakere i perioden 2001-2015 
til å konstruere et paneldatasett med koblinger mellom arbeidstakere og arbeidsgivere. Vi beskriver og 
kvantifiserer flere viktige karakteristikker ved det amerikanske arbeidsmarkedet, som størrelsen på 
bedriftsspesifikke lønnspremier, sortering av arbeidstakere til bedrifter, 
produktivitetskomplementariteter mellom arbeidstakere og bedrifter, og overføringen av bedrifts- og 
markedsspesifikke sjokk til arbeidstakernes lønninger.  
 
Med utgangspunkt i disse empiriske resultatene utvikler, identifiserer og estimerer vi en 
likevektsmodell for et arbeidsmarked med tosidig heterogenitet, hvor arbeidstakerne ser på bedrifter 
som imperfekte substitutter på grunn av heterogene preferanser for ikke-pekuniære former for 
avlønning. Modellen tillater oss å trekke slutninger om graden av ufullkommen konkurranse, 
kompenserende lønnsforskjeller, og fordelingen av monopolprofitt mellom bedrifter og arbeidstakere. 
Videre bruker vi modellen til å kvantifisere betydningen av ikke-pekuniære former for avlønning og 
ufullkommen konkurranse for inntektsulikhet og skattepolitikk, til å studere de økonomiske 
mekanismene bak sorteringen av arbeidstakere til bedrifter, og til å utarbeide en helhetlig forklaring på 
sentrale empiriske kjennetegn ved det amerikanske arbeidsmarkedet. 
 
1 Introduction
How pervasive is imperfect competition in the labor market? Arguably, this question is really
about the size of rents earned by employers and workers from ongoing employment relationships
(Manning, 2011). In the textbook model of a competitive labor market, the law of one price
holds and there should exist a single market compensation for a given quality of a worker, no
matter which employer she works for. If labor markets are imperfectly competitive, however,
the employer or worker or both may also earn rents from an existing employment relationship.
If a worker gets rents, the loss of the current job makes the worker worse off—an identical job
cannot be found at zero cost. If an employer gets rents, the employer will be worse off if a
worker leaves – the marginal product is above the wage and worker replacement is costly.
To draw inference about imperfect competition in the labor market, it therefore seems nat-
ural to measure the size of rents earned by employers and workers. However, these rents are
not directly observed, and recovering them from data has proven difficult for several reasons.1
One challenge is that observationally equivalent workers could be paid differently because of
unobserved skill differences, not imperfect competition (see e.g. Abowd et al., 1999; Gibbons
et al., 2005). Another challenge is that observed wages may not necessarily reflect the full com-
pensation that individuals receive from working in a given firm. Indeed, both survey data (e.g.,
Hamermesh, 1999; Pierce, 2001; Maestas et al., 2018) and experimental studies (e.g., Mas and
Pallais, 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2017) suggest that workers may be willing to sacrifice higher
wages for better non-wage job characteristics or amenities when making firm choices. Thus,
firm-specific wage premiums could reflect unfavorable amenities, not imperfect competition.
The primary goal of our paper is to address these challenges and quantify the importance
of imperfect competition in the U.S. labor market by estimating the size of rents earned by
American firms and workers from ongoing employment relationships. To this end, we construct
a matched employer-employee panel data set by combining the universe of U.S. business and
worker tax records for the period 2001-2015. Using this panel data, we describe several important
features of the U.S. labor market, including the size of firm-specific wage premiums, the sorting of
workers to firms, the production complementarities between high ability workers and productive
firms, and the pass through of firm and market shocks to workers’ wages. Guided by these
empirical results, we develop, identify and estimate a model of the labor market that allows
us to draw inference about imperfect competition, compensating differentials and rent sharing.
We also use the model to quantify the relevance of non-wage job characteristics and imperfect
competition for inequality and tax policy, to assess the economic determinants of worker sorting,
and to offer a unifying explanation of key empirical features of the U.S. labor market.
In Section 2, we describe the business and worker tax records, which provides us with panel
data on the outcomes and characteristics of U.S. firms and workers. The firm data contain
information on sales, revenues and inputs as well as industry codes and geographical identifiers.
We merge the firm data set with worker tax records, creating the matched employer-employee
panel data. In Section 3, we use this panel data data to describe key features of the U.S. labor
1For a recent review of the literature, see Manning (2011).
4
market. This description is based on estimates from a statistical model of earnings that allows
us to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of workers and firms while examining
both the pass through of changes in firm performance to the earnings of its employees as well
as the determinants of the cross-sectional distribution of earnings.
The pass through analysis follows the approach of Guiso et al. (2005), except we allow the
earnings of an incumbent worker to respond differently to an idiosyncratic value added shock
to the current firm than to a (same size) shock to all firms in the same local labor market. The
analysis of cross-sectional earnings inequality builds and extends on the log additive worker and
firm effects wage model proposed by Abowd et al. (1999, AKM hereafter). Unlike AKM, we
allow for interactions between worker and firm effects and we let firm effects evolve over time
as firm shocks pass through to workers’ earnings. In contrast to much of the existing work, we
also attempt to address the concern that estimates of firm effects will be biased upward and
estimates of worker sorting will be biased downward in finite samples, with the size of the bias
depending inversely on the degree of worker mobility among firms (Andrews et al., 2008).
The findings from the statistical model of earnings may be summarized with six broad
conclusions. First, most of the variation in earnings is explained by heterogeneity in the quality
of the workers as measured by their fixed effects. Second, firm effects explain only a few percent
of the variation in earnings. Third, a substantial share of the variation in earnings is due
to positive sorting of better workers to higher paying firms. Our preferred estimates suggest a
correlation between worker effects and firm effects of about 0.4. Fourth, the gains in log earnings
from moving to higher paying firms are considerably larger for better workers. These positive
interaction effects are especially pronounced at the upper tails of the distributions of worker
and firm effects. Fifth, idiosyncratic value added shocks to a firm transmit significantly to the
earnings of its employees. Controlling for time-invariant firm and worker heterogeneity through
a difference-in-differences strategy, we estimate that a 10 percent increase in the value added of
a firm leads to a 1.4 percent increase in the earnings of incumbent workers. Lastly, the earnings
of incumbent workers respond significantly less to an idiosyncratic value added shock to the
current firm than to a (same size) shock to all firms in the same industry and location.
Motivated and guided by these findings, we develop in Section 4 an equilibrium model of
the labor market that builds on work by Rosen (1986), Boal and Ransom (1997), Bhaskar et al.
(2002), Manning (2003), and Card et al. (2018). Competitive labor market theory requires firms
to be wage takers so that labor supply to the individual firm is perfectly elastic. The evidence
that idiosyncratic productivity shocks to a firm transmit to the earnings of its workers is at
odds with this theory. To allow labor supply to be imperfectly elastic, we let multiple employers
compete with one another for workers who have heterogeneous preferences over amenities. Since
we allow these amenities to be unobserved to the analyst, they can include a wide range of
characteristics, such as distance of the firm from the worker’s home, flexibility in the work
schedules, the type of tasks performed, the effort required to perform these tasks, the social
environment in the workplace, and so on.2
2There is limited empirical evidence on which non-wage characteristics matter the most. However, survey data
from Maestas et al. (2018) point to the importance of flexibility in work schedules, the type of tasks performed,
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The importance of workplace amenities has long been recognized in the theory of compen-
sating differentials (Rosen, 1986). This is a theory of vertical differentiation: some employers
offer better amenities than others. Employers that offer favorable amenities attract labor at
lower than average wages, whereas employers offering unfavorable amenities pay premiums as
offsetting compensation in order to attract labor. Our model combines this vertical differentia-
tion with a horizontal employer differentiation: workers have different preferences over the same
workplace amenities. As a result of this preference heterogeneity, the employer faces an upward
sloping supply curve for labor, implying that wages are an increasing function of firm size. We
assume that employers do not observe the idiosyncratic taste for amenities of any given worker.
This information asymmetry implies that employers cannot price discriminate with respect to
workers’ reservation values. Instead, if a firm becomes more productive and thus wants to in-
crease its size, the employer needs to offer higher wages to all workers of a given type. As a
result, the equilibrium allocation of workers to firms creates surplus or rents to inframarginal
workers.
The size of rents is determined by the slope of the labor supply curve facing the firm. The
steeper the labor supply curve, the more important amenities are for workers’ choices of firms
as compared to wages. Therefore, imperfect competition as measured by rents increases in the
progressivity of labor income taxes and in the variability of the idiosyncratic taste for amenities.
However, the existence of rents does not imply the equilibrium allocation of workers is inefficient.
In our model, the market allocation will be inefficient if the firms differ in wage setting power,
and, thus, in the ability to mark down wages relative to the marginal product of labor. To allow
for such differences, we let workers view firms as closer substitutes in some markets than others.
This structure on the workers’ preferences captures that workplace characteristics are likely to
vary systematically across firms depending on location and industry.
In Section 5, we take the model to the data. To increase our confidence in the empirical
findings from the model, we allow for rich unobserved heterogeneity across workers with respect
to preferences and productivity and between firms in terms of technology and amenities. Even so,
it is possible to prove identification of the parameters of interest given the panel data of workers
and firms. To this end, we first show the restrictions on the model primitives that deliver the
statistical model of earnings used to describe the labor market. This forges a direct link between
our model of the labor market in Section 4 and the panel data analyses in Section 3. Once this
link is established, we proceed by showing how the estimates produced by the statistical model
allow us to recover the model-based quantities of interest. For example, the rents earned by
workers can be measured by the elasticity of the labor supply curve to the firm. This elasticity
can be recovered from the difference-in-differences estimate of the pass through of firm shocks to
incumbent workers’ earnings. Another example is the correlation structure in a worker’s taste for
amenities, which can be identified by comparing difference-in differences estimates of the pass-
through rates of firm versus market level shocks. The estimates of worker effects, firm effects
and worker sorting are also important for identification, allowing us to recover the productivity
and the amount of effort required. The analysis of Marinescu and Rathelot (2018) suggests distance of the firm
from the workers’ home may be important.
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of workers, the compensating differentials due to the vertical differentiation of firms, and the
extent to which preferences for amenities vary by worker productivity. To determine whether
productive workers and firms are complements, we take advantage of the estimated interaction
coefficients between worker and firm effects.
The model yields four key findings that we discuss in Section 6. First, there is a significant
amount of rents and imperfect competition in the U.S. labor market due to horizontal employer
differentiation. Workers are, on average, willing to pay 14 percent of their wage to stay in the
current jobs. Comparing these worker rents to those earned by employers suggests that total
rents are divided relatively equally between firms and workers. Second, the evidence of small firm
effects do not imply that labor markets are competitive or that rents are negligible. Instead,
firm effects are small because productive firms tend to have good amenities, which pushes
down the wages that these firms have to pay. As a result of these compensating differentials,
firms contribute much less to earnings inequality than what is predicted by the variance of
firm productivity only. Third, the primary reason why better workers are sorting into better
firms is production complementarities, not heterogeneous tastes for workplace amenities. These
complementarities are key to explain the significant inequality contribution from worker sorting.
Fourth, the monopsonistic labor market creates significant misallocation of workers to firms. We
estimate that a tax reform which would eliminate labor and tax wedges would increase total
welfare by 5 percent and total output by 3 percent.
Our paper relates to a considerable, but largely theoretical, literature on imperfect competi-
tion and rents in the labor market, reviewed in Boal and Ransom (1997) and Manning (2011).
While our model creates wage setting power and rents from horizontal employer differentiation,
alternative micro-foundations of the same imperfectly elastic labor supply curve may be possi-
ble. In such cases, the conclusions drawn about imperfect competition and rent sharing do not
necessarily change. As noted by Manning (2011), the type of monopsony model that we use
can generate a positive relationship between firm-specific productivity and wages that mimics
models in which workers bargain with employers over wages. But in our model, firms set wages
unilaterally and rents are shared only because of information asymmetries. Distinguishing be-
tween alternative sources of imperfect competition and rent sharing is interesting but beyond
the scope of our paper. However, Card et al. (2018) argue that a monopsony type of explanation
for rent sharing is more plausible than one based on worker bargaining power, particularly in
countries that lack strong unions. One interesting implication of the monopsony explanation for
rents is that there is no hold-up problem in the firm’s investment decision. Card et al. (2013a)
find support for this prediction in the data.
The insights from our paper contribute to a large and growing literature on firms and labor
market inequality, reviewed in Card et al. (2018). A number of studies show that trends in
wage dispersion closely track trends in productivity dispersion across industries and workplaces
(Faggio et al., 2010; Dunne et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2016). While this correlation might reflect
that some of the productivity differences across firms spill over to wages, it could also be driven
by changes in the degree to which workers of different quality sort into different firms (see
e.g. Murphy and Topel, 1990; Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Abowd et al., 1999; Gibbons et al.,
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2005). To address the sorting issue, a growing body of work has taken advantage of matched
employer-employee data. Some studies use this data to estimate the pass through of changes in
the value added of a firm to the wages of its workers, while controlling for time-invariant firm
and worker heterogeneity.3 These studies typically report estimates of pass-through rates in the
range of 0.05-0.20. We complement this work by providing evidence of the pass-through rates
for a broad set of firms in the U.S. and by showing how the estimated pass through of firm
and market level shocks can be used to draw inferences about imperfect competition, rents, and
allocative inefficiency.
Another set of studies use the matched employer-employee data to estimate the additive
worker and firm effects wage model proposed by AKM. These studies tend to conclude that
firms play an important role in the wage determination, with a typical finding that about 15-
20 percent of the variance of wages is attributable to firm effects (Card et al., 2018). Some
studies interpret the sizable firm effects as evidence of rents and imperfect competition in the
labor market. Our paper contributes to this literature in three ways. First, our study makes
clear that firm effects neither imply nor are implied by rents. The relevant quantity to measure
imperfect competition and rents is the sensitivity of wages to changes in firm productivity, not
the firm effects. Second, we show that firm effects are small in the U.S. labor market, explaining
only a few percent of the variation in earnings. This finding contrasts with recent work from the
U.S. (Sorkin, 2018; Song et al., 2018) as well as many studies from other developed countries
(Card et al., 2018). The reason is that these studies do not address the concern that estimates
of firm effects will be biased upward and estimates of worker sorting will be biased downward
due to limited worker mobility across firms (Andrews et al., 2008). Following the approaches of
Bonhomme et al. (2019, BLM hereafter) and Kline et al. (2018b), we try to correct for these
biases. Both approaches show that firm effects explain very little of the variation in earnings in
the U.S. economy, once one corrects for bias due to limited mobility. Instead, a substantial part
of the variation in earnings is due to positive sorting of high wage workers to high paying firms.
These findings conform to what BLM find for Sweden. Third, we find evidence of non-additivity
in the U.S. wage structure. The interaction effects are economically significant, incentivizing
better workers to sort into productive firms.
Our paper also relates to a literature that tries to measure the role of compensating differ-
entials for wage setting and earnings inequality. This literature is reviewed in Taber and Vejlin
(2016) and Sorkin (2018). Much of the existing evidence comes from hedonic regressions of
earnings on one or more observable non-wage characteristics of jobs, employers, or industries,
interpreting the regression coefficients as the market prices of those amenities. Typical estimates
of these coefficients are small in magnitude and sometimes of the wrong sign (Bonhomme and
3See e.g. Guiso et al. (2005), Card et al. (2013a), Card et al., 2018, Carlsson et al. (2016), Lamadon (2016),
Friedrich et al. (2019). A concern with this approach is that measures of firm productivity may reflect a number
of factors. Some studies have therefore examine the pass through of specific, observable changes. For example,
Van Reenen (1996) studies how innovation affects firms’ profit and workers’ wages. He also investigated patents
as a source of variation, but found them to be weakly correlated with profits. Building on this insight, Kline et al.
(2018a) studies the incidence of patents that are predicted to be valuable. A related literature has examined the
wage and productivity effects of adoption of new technology in firms (see Akerman et al., 2015, and the references
therein).
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Jolivet, 2009). However, these estimates could be severely biased, either due to correlations be-
tween observed amenities and unobserved firm characteristics or because of assortative matching
(on unobservables) between workers and firms (see e.g. the discussion in Ekeland et al., 2004).
Several recent studies have used panel data in an attempt to address these concerns. Like
us, Taber and Vejlin (2016), Lavetti and Schmutte (2017), and Sorkin (2018) take advantage
of matched longitudinal employer-employee data to allow for unobserved heterogeneity across
firms.
Our paper differs from the existing literature on compensating differentials in several ways.
One important difference is that amenities, in our model, create both vertical and horizontal
employer differentiation. The latter generate imperfect competition ,wage setting power and
rents; the former acts as standard compensating differentials. By comparison, compensating
differentials have typically been analyzed in models with perfect competition or search frictions
(see e.g. Mortensen, 2003). Our paper also allows for ex-ante worker heterogeneity in produc-
tivity and preferences which generate sorting between firms and workers, in contrast to, for
example, Sorkin (2018). Our estimates suggest that worker heterogeneity and sorting are em-
pirically important features of the U.S. labor market which are necessary to take into account
to understand the determinants of earnings inequality. By taking our model to the data, we are
able to quantify the relative importance of amenities versus production complementarities for
worker sorting and earnings inequality. Lastly, our paper differs in that we move beyond the
impact of amenities on wages and worker sorting, examining also the implications for tax policy
and allocative efficiency. In our model, wages are taxed but the (idiosyncratic taste for) ameni-
ties are not. Thus, progressive taxation on labor income may distort the worker’s decision of
which firm and market to work in. We analyze, theoretically and empirically, the consequences
of this distortion and how changes in the tax system may help improve the allocation of workers
to firms.4
2 Data Sources and Sample Selection
2.1 Data sources
Our empirical analyses are based on a matched employer-employee panel data set with infor-
mation on the characteristics and outcomes of U.S. workers and firms. This data is constructed
by linking U.S. Treasury business tax filings with worker-level filings for the years 2001-2015.
Below, we briefly describe data sources, sample selection, and key variables, while details about
the data construction and the definition of each of the variables are given in Online Appendix
A.
Business tax returns include balance sheet and other information from Forms 1120 (C-
corporations), 1120S (S-corporations), and 1065 (partnerships). The key variables that we
4Tax theory in the Mirrlees (1971) tradition generally assumes the labor markets are perfectly competitive. A
notable exception is Cahuc and Laroque (2014) who develop a model for optimal taxation under monopsonistic
markets. A larger literature considers tax design in situations with search frictions. See Yazici and Sleet (2017)
and the references therein.
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draw on from the business tax filings are the firm’s employer identification number (EIN) and
its value added, commuting zone, and industry code. Value added is the difference between
receipts and the cost of goods sold. Commuting zone is constructed using the ZIP code of the
firm’s business filing address. Industry is defined as the first two digits of the firm’s NAICS code.
We define a market as the combination of an industry and a commuting zone. At times we will
aggregate these markets according to the combination of Census regions (Midwest, Northeast,
South, West) and broad sectors (Goods and Services). We will refer to this classification as
broad markets.
Earnings data are based on taxable remuneration for labor services reported on form W-2
for direct employees and on form 1099 for independent contractors. Earnings include wages
and salaries, bonuses, tips, exercised stock options, and other sources of income deemed taxable
by the IRS. These forms are filed by the firm on behalf of the worker and provide the firm-
worker link. We express all monetary variables in 2015 dollars, adjusting for inflation using the
Consumer Price Index.
2.2 Sample Selection
In each year, we start with all individuals aged 25-60 who are linked to at least one employer.
Next, we define the worker’s firm as the EIN that pays her the greatest direct (W-2) earnings
in that year. This definition of a firm conforms to previous research using the U.S. business tax
records (see, e.g., Song et al., 2018). The EIN defines a corporate unit for tax and accounting
purposes. It is a more aggregated concept than an establishment, which is the level of analysis
considered in recent research on U.S. Census data (see, e.g., Barth et al., 2016), but a less
aggregated concept than a parent corporation. As a robustness check, we investigated the
sensitivity of the estimated firm wage premiums to restricting the sample to EINs that appear
to have a single primary establishment. These are EINs for which the majority of workers live
in the same commuting zone. It is reassuring to find that the estimated firm wage premiums do
not materially change when we use this restricted sample.5
Since we do not observe hours worked or a direct measure of full-time employment, we
follow the literature by including only workers for whom annual earnings are above a minimum
threshold (see, e.g., Song et al., 2018). In the baseline specification, this threshold is equal to
$15,000 per year (in 2015 dollars), which is approximately what people would earn if they work
full-time at the federal minimum wage. As a robustness check, we investigate the sensitivity of
our results to other choices of a minimum earnings threshold. We further restrict the sample to
firms with non-missing value added, commuting zone, and industry. The full sample includes
447.5 (39.2) million annual observations on 89.6 (6.5) million unique workers (firms).
In parts of the analysis, we consider two distinct subsamples. The first subsample, which
we refer to as the stayers sample, restricts the full sample to workers observed with the same
employer for eight consecutive years. This restriction is needed to allow for a flexible specification
5In the baseline sample, the AKM (BLM) estimates of firm effects are around 10 (3) percent. By comparison,
the restricted sample gives AKM (BLM) estimates of approximately 9 (3) percent.
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Workers Firms
Panel A. Baseline Sample
Unique Observation-Years Unique Observation-Years
Full Sample: 89,570,480 447,519,609 6,478,231 39,163,975
Panel B. Movers Sample
Unique Observation-Years Unique Observation-Years
Movers Only: 32,070,390 207,990,422 3,559,678 23,321,807
Panel C. Stayers Sample
Unique 6 Year Spells Unique 6 Year Spells
Complete Stayer Spells: 10,311,339 35,123,330 1,549,190 6,533,912
10 Stayers per Firm: 6,297,042 20,354,024 144,412 597,912
10 Firms per Market: 5,217,960 16,506,865 117,698 476,878
Table 1: Overview of the Sample
Notes: This table provides an overview of the full sample, movers sample, and stayers sample, including the
steps involved in defining the stayers sample.
of how the worker’s earnings evolve over time. Specifically, we omit the first and last years
of these spells (to avoid concerns over workers exiting and entering employment during the
year, confounding the measure of annual earnings) and analyze the remaining six-year spells.
Furthermore, the stayers sample is restricted to employers that do not change commuting zone
or industry during those eight years. Lastly, we restrict the stayers sample to firms with at least
10 such stayers and markets with at least 10 such firms, which helps to ensure sufficient sample
size to perform the analyses at both the firm and the market level. The stayers sample includes
35.1 (6.5) million spells on 10.3 (1.5) million unique workers (firms).
The second subsample, which we refer to as the movers sample, restricts the full sample to
workers observed at multiple firms. That is, it is not the same EIN that pays the worker the
greatest direct (W-2) earnings in all years. Following previous work, we also restrict the movers
sample to firms with at least two movers. This restriction might help reduce the limited mobility
bias. It also makes it easier to directly compare the AKM and BLM estimates of firm effects to
those produced by the approach of Kline et al. (2018b) (which requires at least two movers per
firm). The movers sample includes 32.1 (3.6) million unique workers (firms).
Table 1 compares the size of the baseline, the stayers, and the movers samples. Detailed
summary statistics of these samples of linked firms and worker are given in Online Appendix
Table A.1. The samples are broadly similar, both in the distribution of earnings but also in
firm-level variables such as value added, wage bill, size, and the geographic distribution across
regions and sectors. The most noticeable differences are that the stayers have, on average,
somewhat higher earnings and tend to work in firms with higher value added.
3 Key features of the U.S. labor market
In this section, we use the panel data on workers and firms to describe key features of the U.S.
labor market. We begin by describing the statistical model of earnings that we will apply to this
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data. Next, we present the empirical findings, and then discuss how they motivate and guide
our choices of how to model the labor market.
3.1 Statistical model of earnings
We assume that workers’ earnings can be described by the following equation:
logWit = X ′itϑ+ wit, (1)
where Wit denotes the earnings for individual i in year t, Xit is a vector of covariates which
includes a full set of indicators for calendar years and a cubic polynomial in age, and wit denotes
log earnings net of age effects and common aggregate time trends. As described below, we allow
wit to depend on both the workers’ own productivity and the firm in which she works. Our
measure of firm performance is value added, which is determined by the equation:
log Yjt = Z ′tϕ+ yjt, (2)
where Yjt denotes the value added for firm j in year t, Zt includes a full set of indicators
for calendar years, and yjt is log value added net of common aggregate time trends. The key
elements of equations (1) and (2) are the time series properties of wit and yjt, which we now
specify.
3.1.1 Specification of processes
We assume that yjt evolve according to the following process:
yjt = ζj + y
p





ujt = u˜jt + u¯r(j),t
where r(j) denotes the market of firm j, ζj is a fixed effect for the firm, and the time-varying part
of yjt is decomposed into a permanent component, assumed to follow a unit root process with
innovation shock ujt, and a transitory component, which is assumed to follow a MA(1) process
with coefficients δy and innovation variance σ2ξ . The permanent innovation ujt consists of a
common innovation to all firms in a given market r, u¯r(j),t ≡ E [ujt|r(j)=r], and an idiosyncratic
innovation specific to the firm, u˜jt ≡ ujt−u¯r(j),t.
We assume that wit evolve according to the following process:
wit = φij(i,t) + w
p




it−1 + γu˜j(i,t),t + Υ u¯r(i,t),t + µit,
where j(i, t) and r(i, t) denote the firm and market of worker i in year t, and φij is a fixed effect
for worker i if she works in firm j. The time-varying part of wit is decomposed into a permanent
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component wpit and a transitory component, assumed to follow a MA(1) process with coefficients
δw and innovation variance σ2v . The permanent earnings component evolves for three reasons:
worker-specific innovations µit, pass through of firm-specific value added shocks γu˜j(i),t,t, and
pass through of market level value added shocks Υ u¯r(i,t),t.
3.1.2 Parameters of interest and assumptions
Our interest is centered on two aspects of this statistical model of earnings. The first is how
changes in firm performance affect the earnings of incumbent workers, as measured by the pass-
through rates γ and Υ . The second is the determinants of the cross-sectional distribution of
earnings, which we measure by decomposing φij into components that capture worker hetero-
geneity, firm-specific wage premiums, worker sorting, and interactions between worker and firm
effects.
For these purposes, it is necessary to invoke some restrictions on the statistical model of
earnings. Let J = {j(i, t)}i,t and U = {u˜jt, u¯r(j),t}j,t and Q = {ξjt}j,t. We make the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1. E [ξjt|r(j)=r, J, U ] = E [ξjt′ξjt|r(j)=r, J, U ] = 0 for all j, r, t, t′.
Assumption 2. E [µit, νit|J, U,Q] = 0 for all i, t.
Assumption 1 is the same restriction on the error structure of the value added process as in Guiso
et al. (2005). It implies that transitory shocks to value added are mean zero and uncorrelated
with past transitory shocks to value added. Assumption 2 is a condition on the relationship
between the worker-specific innovations to earnings, worker mobility, and innovations to firm
value added. The assumption embodies two types of economic restrictions. The first restriction,
from conditioning on j(i, t), implies that mobility is exogenous to the worker-specific innovations
to earnings (which are paid to the worker independent of the choice of firm). This is the
same restriction on worker mobility as invoked in the Abowd et al. (1999) model. The second
restriction, from the conditioning on the innovations to firm value added, implies that the
worker-specific innovations to earnings neither co-vary across coworkers nor with shocks to firm
value added. This is the same restriction as in Guiso et al. (2005).
It is important to observe what is not being restricted under Assumptions 1 and 2. First,
we do not restrict whether or how workers sort into firms according to the worker effects, the
firm effects, or the interactions between the worker and firm effects. Second, we do not restrict
whether or what type of workers move across firms in response to innovations to firm value
added. In fact, workers with different values of φij may have arbitrarily different mobility
patterns. Third, the statistical model of earnings does not specify why individuals choose the
firm that they do. However, it also does not preclude the possibility that individuals choose firms
to maximize earnings or utilities. For instance, Assumptions 1 and 2 are consistent with each
worker choosing the firm that offers his preferred combination of wages and non-wage attributes,
as shown in Section 5.
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3.2 Pass through of firm shocks
In this section, we are interested in estimating the parameters γ and Υ , which we refer to as
the pass-through rates of firm-specific and market level value added shocks. Before presenting
estimates of the pass-through rates, we show how these parameters can be identified through a
difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy.
3.2.1 Identification, moment conditions and DiD representation
To compare with existing work, we first consider a special case of the statistical model of earnings
where γ = Υ . That is, we assume the pass-through rate of an idiosyncratic value added shock to
the current firm is of the same size as the pass-through rate of a value added shock to all firms
in the current market. We focus on the sample of stayers as captured by the indicator variable
Si = 1[j(i, 1)=...=j(i, T )].






wit+τ − wit−τ ′ − γ
(
yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si=1] = 0 (5)
for τ ≥ 2, τ ′ ≥ 3











yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′
) |Si=1]
Thus, we can identify the pass through of a firm-specific shock from our panel data on firms
and workers.
DiD interpretation
To interpret this identification result and assess the underlying assumptions, note that the sta-
tistical model of earnings includes fixed effects for time and agents. By controlling for these fixed
effects we obtain a DiD strategy, looking within workers and firms while eliminating common
changes over time in the labor market or the economy more generally. To see the DiD represen-
tation, suppose for simplicity the workers can be assigned to two groups of firms: one half has
∆yj(i)t = +δ and the other half has ∆yj(i)t = −δ . We then get the following interpretation of
γ as the ratio of two DiDs.
γ =
E [wit+τ − wit−τ ′ |+δ, Si=1]− E [wit+τ − wit−τ ′ |−δ, Si=1]
E
[
yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′ |+δ, Si=1
]− E [yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′ |−δ, Si=1]
Under an assumption of common underlying trends between the two groups, the numerator
gives the treatment effect on log earnings; the denominator gives the treatment effect on log
value added; and the ratio gives the elasticity of earnings with respect to value added.
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Graphical evidence
In Figure 1, we empirically assess the DiD strategy. The figure is constructed in the following
way: In any given calendar year (denoted period t = 0), we i) order firms according to the
increase ∆yj(i)t; ii) separate the firms at the median in the distribution of ∆yj(i)t, letting the
upper half constitute the treatment firms and the lower half the control firms; and iii) plot
the differences in yjt between these two groups in period t = 0 as well as in the years before
(periods t < 0) and after (periods t > 0). We perform these three steps separately for various
calendar years, always weighting each firm by the number of workers. The solid (dashed) black
line represents the difference in log value added (wages) for the treatment and control firms
where each firm is weighted by the number of workers.
By construction, the treatment and control groups differ in the value added growth from
period t−1 to period t. On average, firms in the treatment group experience about 30 percentage
points larger growth in value added as compared to firms in the control group. According to the
value added process (3), the growth in value added should be the sum of a permanent component
and a transitory, mean-reverting component. Due to the transitory component, ∆yj(i)t could
be correlated with ∆yj(i)τ at τ = t − 2, ..., t + 2. However, ∆yj(i)t should be orthogonal to
∆yj(i)τ in the periods before τ = t − 2 and after τ = t + 2. Consistent with this orthogonality
condition, the figure shows a very similar trend in log value added between the treatment and
control group at these periods. Reassuringly, firms that experienced large growth in value added
in period 0 are no more or less likely to experience large growth in value added in periods -6 to
-3 or in periods 3 to 6.
The dashed black line performs the same exercise, but this time for log wages of incumbent
workers who stay in the firm in all six years. On average, workers in treatment firms experience
an additional 5 percentage points increase in earnings in period 0 as compared to workers in
the control firms. Interpreted through the lens of the DiD design, this finding suggests a pass-
through rate of firm shocks γ above .15. The growth in earnings is also the sum of a permanent
component and a transitory, mean-reverting component. Therefore, ∆wit could be correlated
with ∆wiτ at τ = t − 2, ..., t + 2, but it should be orthogonal to ∆wiτ in the periods before
τ = t − 2 and after τ = t + 2. Reassuringly, the dashed line shows a very similar trend in log
earnings between workers in the treatment and control group during these periods.
Firm versus market level shocks
We now shift attention to the general case where γ may differ from Υ , thereby allowing the
earnings of an incumbent worker to respond differently to an idiosyncratic value added shock
to the current firm than to a (same size) shock to all firms in a given market. To identify the
firm-level pass-through rate γ, we then need to demean the variables of interest using a within
market times year transformation, w˜it = wit−E [wit|r(i, t)=r] and y˜jt = yjt−E [yjt|r(j)=r]. As
shown in Online Appendix B.5, Assumptions 1 and 2 then give the following moment conditions





























Figure 1: Difference-in-differences representation of the estimation procedure
Notes: This figure displays the mean differences in log value added (solid lines) and log earnings (dotted lines)
between firms that receive an above-median versus below-median log value added change at event time zero.
Results are presented for the unconditional measures of log value added and log earnings (black lines), for the
measures of log value added and log earnings net of market interacted with year effects (red lines), and for the
averages of log value added and log earnings by market and year (blue lines). The shaded area denotes the time
periods during which the orthogonality condition need not hold in the identification of the permanent
pass-through rate.





w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ ′ − γ
(
y˜j(i),t+τ − y˜j(i),t−τ ′





w¯it+τ − w¯it−τ ′ − Υ
(
y¯j(i),t+τ − y¯j(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si=1] = 0 (7)
for τ ≥ 2, τ ′ ≥ 3
where y¯r(j),t ≡ E [yjt|r(j)=r] and w¯r(j),t ≡ E [wjt|r(j)=r].
The red and blue lines in Figure 1 represent the differences between the treatment and control
group in (w˜it, y˜jt) and (w¯r(i,t),t, y¯r(j),t) over time. These lines are constructed in the same way as
the black lines, except the red and blue lines use the demeaned variables w˜ and y˜ and the market
averages w¯ and y¯, respectively. Comparing the red solid line to the red dashed line reveals that
conditioning on the full set of year times market fixed effects attenuates slightly the treatment
effect on log earnings relative to the treatment effect on log value added. Interpreted through the
lens of the DiD design, this finding suggests the estimated pass-through rate of a firm-specific
shock will be slightly lower once we allow for Υ to differ from γ. By way of comparison, the DiD
applied to the market averages of wages and value added suggests a relatively large estimate of
Υ . Thus, we expect the estimated pass-through rate of an idiosyncratic value added shock to
the current firm γ to be smaller than the pass-through rate of a same size shock to all firms in
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the market Υ .
3.2.2 Estimates of the pass-through rates
To obtain point estimates and standard errors of the pass-through parameters, we jointly esti-
mate the earnings and value added processes (3) and (4) using generalized method of moments
(GMM). These processes are estimated on the stayers sample, pooling the data for all years but
taking out common calendar year effects. The parameter estimates are summarized in Table 2.
We refer to Online Appendix B.5 for the full set of parameter estimates and for details on how
the processes are estimated. Specification checks are reported in Online Appendix Table B.1,
supporting our main specification of the time series properties of wit and yjt.
Main results
To compare with existing work, we first consider the estimation results from the restricted
specification that imposes Υ = γ. These results are reported in the first two columns of Table
2. The standard deviation in log earnings growth is 0.17. Decomposing the variance in log
earnings growth, we find that almost 40 percent is due to permanent shocks at the worker level,
58 percent can be attributed to transitory shocks at the worker level, and 3 percent is due to the
pass through of permanent shocks to value added at the firm level. The estimated pass-through
rate γˆ is 0.14 with a standard error of 0.01, suggesting that a 10 percent permanent increase
in the value added of the firm leads to a 1.4 percent permanent increase in the earnings of
incumbent workers.
As shown in the last two columns of Table 2, however, the estimated pass through differs
materially depending on whether the shock is specific to the firm or common to all firms in the
same market. Conditional on the full set of year times market fixed effects, the pass-through
rate of a firm-level shock is very precisely estimated at 0.13. By way of comparison, a common
shock to firms in the same market has a much larger pass through. The estimated market pass-
through rate Υˆ is 0.18 with a standard error of 0.02, suggesting that the earnings of incumbent
workers increases by 1.8 percent if all firms in their market experience a 10 percent permanent
increase in value added. This finding highlights the importance of distinguishing between shocks
that are specific to workers in a given firm versus those that common to workers in a market.
Our specification of the earnings process allows permanent shocks to value added to be
transmitted to workers’ earnings, whereas transitory firm shocks are not. As a specification
check, we allow transitory innovations to value added to transmit to workers’ earnings. We find
little if any pass through of transitory shocks. As a result, transitory shocks explain as little as
0.1 percent of the variation in log earnings. This finding is consistent with previous work (see
e.g. Guiso et al. 2005; Friedrich et al. 2019). A possible interpretation of this finding is that
transitory changes in value added reflect measurement error that do not give rise to economic
responses. In the remainder of the paper, we will treat the transitory changes in value added as
measurement error and focus on the pass through of the permanent shocks.
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Parameters and Growth Decomposition
Firm Only Accounting for Markets
Parameter Var. (%) Parameter Var. (%)
Permanent Worker Shock (Std. Dev.) 0.10 39.5% 0.10 38.1%
(0.00) (0.00)
Transitory Worker Shock (Std. Dev.) 0.13 57.6% 0.13 57.4%
(0.00) (0.00)
Permanent Firm Shock Passed-through (Std. Dev.) 0.03 2.8% 0.02 1.8%
(0.00) (0.00)
— Permanent Firm Shock Passthrough Coefficient 0.14 0.13
(0.01) (0.01)
Transitory Firm Shock Passed-through (Std. Dev.) 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0%
(0.00) (0.00)
— Transitory Firm Shock Passthrough Coefficient -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Market Shock Passed-through (Std. Dev.) 0.02 1.1%
(0.00)
— Market Shock Passthrough Coefficient 0.18
(0.02)
Table 2: GMM estimates of the earnings and value added processes
Notes: This table displays the pass-through rates and the decomposition of earnings growth of the joint
processes of log value added and log earnings. These results come from joint estimation of the earnings and
value added processes (3) and (4) using GMM. Columns 1-2 report results from the specification which imposes
Υ = γ (“Firm only”), while columns 3-4 report results from the specification which allows Υ to differ from γ
(“Accounting for Markets”). “Var. (%)” refers to the percent of log earnings changes explained. The variance
explained by transitory worker shock refers to the share of the total variance explained by the MA(1) process.
The variance explained by permanent firm (market) shock passed-through refers to the share of the total
variance explained by permanent value added shocks at the firm (market) level that are passed through to
workers’ earnings. Standard errors are estimated using 40 block bootstrap draws in which the block is taken to
be the market. See Online Appendix Table B.1 for the full set of parameter estimates (Panel A) and for results
from the MA(2) specification of the transitory process (Panel B)
Heterogeneity and robustness
In Online Appendix Figure B.1, we explore heterogeneity and robustness of the pass through
estimates. This figure reports separate estimates of the earnings and value added processes (3)
and (4) for each subgroup of stayers. Conditional on a full set of year times market fixed effects,
we find that the pass-through rates do not vary that much by the worker’s age, previous wage,
or gender. Moreover, the pass through rates do not change materially if we restrict the sample
to new workers who were first hired at the firm in the beginning of the eight year employment
spell versus those that have stayed in the firm for a longer time.
In Online Appendix Figure B.1b, we present results from several specification checks. Fol-
lowing Guiso et al. (2005), our main measure of firm performance is value added. They offer two
reasons for using value added as a measure of firm performance. First, they argue, value added
is the variable that is directly subject to stochastic fluctuations. Second, firms have discre-
tionary power over the reporting of profits in balance sheets, which makes profits a less reliable
objective to assess. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to find that the estimates of the pass-through
rates are broadly similar if we measure firm performance by operating profits, earnings before
interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD), or value added net of reported depreciation of capital.
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We also show that the estimated pass-through rate is in the same range as our baseline result if
we exclude multinational corporations (for which it can be difficult to accurately measure value
added) or exclude the largest firms (that are more likely to have multiple plants, which may not
necessarily have the same wage setting).
3.3 Worker heterogeneity, firm wage premiums and worker sorting
We now turn attention to quantifying the importance of worker heterogeneity, firm wage premi-
ums, worker sorting, and interactions between worker and firm effects as sources of inequality
in the U.S. labor market.
3.3.1 Two-way (worker and firm) fixed effect model
To begin with, we consider a special case which assumes that φij = xi+ψj and that γ = Υ = 0.
The first restriction imposes a log additive structure on the earnings that worker i can expect
to receive from working in firm j. Under this functional form, the worker fixed effect captures
the (time-invariant) portable component of earnings ability, whereas the firm fixed effect can
be interpreted as a firm-specific relative pay premium. The second restriction assumes there is
no pass through of firm or market level shocks. As a result, the firm effects on earnings do not
vary over time. By invoking these two restrictions, our statistical model of earnings reduces to
the two-way (worker and firm) fixed effect model of AKM.
Under the above restrictions, the variance of log earnings can be written as:
V ar(logWit) = V ar(xi + X ′itb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker component
+ V ar(ψj(i,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm component
+ 2Cov(xi + X ′itb, ψj(i,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sorting component
+V ar(it)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residual
(8)
where the worker and firm components tell us how much of the variation in log earnings can
be attributed to heterogeneity in worker and firm effects, respectively. The third component
captures the contribution to earnings inequality from the sorting of workers to firms. The goal
is to quantify these three components to draw inference about the determinants of earnings
inequality in the U.S. economy. The decomposition includes both workers who move between
firms and stayers. However, the firm and worker effects are only separately identified within a
connected set of firms that are linked by worker mobility. Consistent with previous work, we
therefore restrict our sample of workers (including stayers and movers) to those who work at a
firm in the largest connected set in each time interval (2001-2008 and 2008-2015). In the U.S.,
this set covers more than 90 percent of the workers (see Online Appendix Table B.2).
Limited mobility bias
Even if the above restrictions hold, it is challenging to draw inference about the inequality
contribution from firm effects and worker sorting. A key challenge is the incidental parameter
bias caused by the large number of firm-specific parameters that are solely identified from workers
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Figure 2: Empirical Characterization of Limited Mobility Bias
Notes: In this figure, we consider the subset of firms with at least 15 movers. We randomly remove movers
within each firm and re-estimate the variance of firm effects using the AKM and BLM estimators. For each
estimator, we repeat this procedure several times, and then take averages of the variance estimates across these
repetitions. The procedure allows us to keep the connected set of firms approximately the same and examine
the bias that results from having fewer movers available in estimation.
can be substantial. With few movers per firm, the firm component is biased upwards while the
sorting component is biased downwards, with the size of the bias depending inversely on the
degree of worker mobility among firms.
To get a better sense of the scope for limited mobility bias in the U.S. data, we would ideally
apply the AKM estimator to alternative samples of workers and firms that are comparable
except for the number of movers per firm. Figure 2 presents the results from such an analysis,
suggesting that the variance of firm effects declines monotonically as the number of movers
per firm increases. To construct this figure, we consider a subsample of firms with reasonably
many movers; that is, at least 15 movers per firm over the period 2001-2008. Applying AKM
to this subsample gives an estimate of the variance of firm effects of 6.7 percent. Next, we
remove movers randomly within firms (keeping the connected set of firms approximately the
same) before re-estimating the AKM model. The solid line displays the AKM estimates of
the variance of firm effects after randomly removing movers. Consistent with limited mobility
bias, the fewer the number of movers per firm, the larger the variance of firm effects. For
approximately the same set of firms, the estimated variance of firm effects is several times as
large (23 percent) if we only keep ten percent of the movers within each firm (on average, 7
movers per firm) as compared to what we obtained if we keep all the movers per firm (at a
minimum 15 and, on average, 62 movers per firm). By way of comparison, there are around
18 movers per firm in the full estimation sample (which roughly corresponds to the number of
movers per firm when randomly removing 40% of movers).
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Until recently, the procedures for addressing limited mobility bias required strong and ques-
tionable assumptions about the covariance structure of the time-varying errors (see e.g. the
discussion in Card et al., 2018). To address this shortcoming, BLM and Kline et al. (2018b)
propose approaches to address limited mobility bias that rely on a different or weaker set of
assumptions.6 The first approach reduces the dimension of firm heterogeneity to a finite num-
ber of types. BLM show how this approach can be used to alleviate the biases arising from
low mobility rates. The second approach uses a version of the Jackknife method. Kline et al.
(2018b) show how this approach allows one to relax the homoskedasticity assumption in the bias
correction procedure proposed by Andrews et al. (2008). Since it is computationally infeasible
to apply Andrews et al. (2008) and Kline et al. (2018b) to very large data sets (as one needs
to compute the trace of the inverse of the mobility matrix), our main analysis is based on the
approach of BLM. As a robustness check, however, we use a subset of the U.S. states to assess
the sensitivity of the results to the choice of procedure for addressing limited mobility bias.
In Figure 2, the dotted line shows estimates of the variance of firm effects based on the
procedure of BLM that addresses limited mobility bias. As described in Section 5.4, firms are first
classified into groups based on the empirical earnings distribution using the k-means clustering
algorithm. The k-means classification groups together firms whose earnings distribution is most
similar. Then, in a second step, the worker effects and firm effects are estimated. While the
specification of BLM in Figure 2 assumes there exists 10 firm types, Online Appendix Figure
B.4 shows the BLM estimates do not materially change if we instead allow for 20, 30, 40 or
50 firm types. Consistent with limited mobility bias, the BLM estimates are noticeably smaller
than the standard AKM estimates in the samples with few movers. As expected, the AKM
estimates become more similar to the BLM estimates when there is a large number of movers
per firm, and thus, limited mobility bias should be small.
Estimates of worker effects, firm effects, and worker sorting
While the analysis in Figure 2 is useful to illustrate the scope for limited mobility bias, it does
not offer estimates of firm effects for the entire connected set. In Table 3, we present results
from the variance decomposition in (8) based on data for all firms and workers in the connected
set (which includes both workers who move between firms and stayers). This table reports
estimates of the worker, firm and sorting components as defined in equation (8).
Consider first Panel A of Table 3 where we present estimates from the AKM estimator for two
different time periods (2001-2008 and 2008-2015) as well as pooled estimates where we combine
the data from these time periods. The results show that the worker, firm and sorting components
change little over time. Therefore, we focus attention on the pooled estimates. These results
suggest that the firm effects explain around 9 percent of the variation in log earning, whereas
worker sorting accounts for 5 percent. The correlation between firm effects and worker effects
is only 0.1.
6Borovickova and Shimer (2017) propose a different approach that redefines firm types as the average firm wage
rather than the wage premium, and relies on independence restrictions to recover the variance decomposition for
this alternative definition.
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Next, consider Panel B of Table 3 where we report the BLM estimates. As discussed above,
a possible advantage of the BLM estimator is that it addresses limited mobility bias. Once we
correct for such bias we find that firm effects are very small in the U.S. labor market, accounting
for only 3 percent of the variation in log earnings. Instead, a larger part of the earnings variation
is explained by worker sorting. The correlation between firm effects and worker effects exceeds
0.4 once we correct for limited mobility bias. This finding suggests that sorting of better workers
to better firms is an empirically important feature of the U.S. labor market.
Our findings of small firm effects and strong sorting are at odds with recent work from the
U.S. (Sorkin, 2018; Song et al., 2018) as well as many studies from other developed countries
(Card et al., 2018). We argue the reason is that the existing literature do not properly address
the concern over limited mobility bias.7 This raises questions such as: How do our results from
the AKM estimator compare to those reported in the existing literature? Are the bias-corrected
estimates sensitive to the procedure used?
To examine the first question of how our AKM results compare to existing work, consider
Song et al. (2018, using SSA data from all U.S. states) and Sorkin (2018, using LEHD data for
a subset of states). Both studies apply the AKM estimator, finding that firm effects explain 12
percent (Song et al., 2018) and 14 percent (Sorkin, 2018) of the variation in log earnings.8 By
comparison, our AKM estimates suggest that firm effects explain 9 percent of the variation in
log earnings. The key reason for this discrepancy seems to be the sample restrictions. We only
include workers with earnings above the full-time minimum wage threshold. By comparison,
Song et al. (2018) and Sorkin (2018) include individuals who work part time as long as their
annual earnings exceed 25 percent of the full-time minimum wage threshold. In Online Appendix
Figure B.2, we investigate what happens if we use their earnings cutoff. The AKM estimates
then suggest that firm effects explain 11 percent of the variation of log earnings, which is nearly
identical to the estimate of Song et al. (2018) and fairly similar to Sorkin (2018). This figure
also shows estimates for a range of alternative earnings cutoffs. While the total log earnings
variance increases substantially as the earnings cutoff decreases, the share of variation explained
by AKM firm effects is relatively stable.
To investigate the second question of the sensitivity of the bias-corrected estimates, we
restrict attention to workers and firms from a set of smaller states. This is necessary because it
is computationally infeasible to apply Andrews et al. (2008) and Kline et al. (2018b) to the entire
U.S. data. Online Appendix Figure B.5 compares the results from these alternative procedures
for correcting for limited mobility bias to the estimates from BLM and AKM. The conclusion is
clear: Limited mobility bias leads to upward bias in the AKM estimate of the firm component
and downward bias in the AKM estimate of the worker sorting component. On average across
7Sorkin (2018) and Song et al. (2018) point out that limited mobility may bias their AKM estimates. In
an attempt to investigate this issue, Sorkin (2018) also performs a few checks, including restricting the sample
to large firms and splitting the sample in half on the basis of workers (which lets him compare results from
two separate samples). Limited mobility bias, however, is about having few movers per firm, not small firms.
Furthermore, the checks he perform involve significant changes in the composition of firms and workers in the
estimation sample, in part because the connected set changes. Thus, it is not clear what, if any, conclusions one
may draw about limited mobility bias from these checks.
8See Song et al. (2018), Appendix Table 2, and Sorkin (2018), Appendix Table 1.
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Years: 2001-2008 2008-2015 Pooled
Panel A. AKM Estimation
Share explained by:
i) Worker Effects V ar(xi) 75% 75% 75%
ii) Firm Effects V ar(ψj(i)) 9% 9% 9%
iii) Sorting 2Cov(xi, ψj(i)) 5% 6% 5%
Sorting Correlation: Cor(xi, ψj(i)) 0.09 0.11 0.10
Panel B. BLM Estimation
Share explained by:
i) Worker Effects V ar(xi) 72% 72% 72%
ii) Firm Effects V ar(ψj(i)) 3% 3% 3%
iii) Sorting 2Cov(xi, ψj(i)) 13% 14% 14%
Sorting Correlation: Cor(xi, ψj(i)) 0.43 0.46 0.44
Table 3: Decomposition results using AKM and BLM
Notes: This table presents the decomposition of log earnings variation using the AKM and BLM estimators for
two time intervals. The analysis uses both workers who move between firms and stayers.
the states we consider, AKM suggests that firm effects explain more than 11 percent of the
variation in log earnings. By contrast Andrews et al. (2008) and Kline et al. (2018b) suggest
that firm effects explain about 5 percent, whereas the BLM method produces an estimate of
firm effects around 2-3 percent.
Inequality within and between firms
We now shift attention to describing the inequality within and between firms. To do so, we
follow Song et al. (2018) in expressing the variance of log earnings as:
V ar(logWit) = V ar (logWit − E [logWit|j(i, t) = j])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within−firm
+V ar (E [logWit|j(i, t) = j])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between−firm
(9)
= V ar (xi + X ′itb− E [xi + X ′itb|j(i, t) = j])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker heterogeneity within firms










xi + X ′itb, ψj(i,t)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sorting
+V ar (E [xi + X ′itb|j(i, t) = j])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Segregation
where the first equality expresses the variance of log earnings in terms of inequality within and
between firms, and the second equality decomposes these terms into economically interpretable
subcomponents. Our interest is centered on the last three subcomponents, which capture distinct
sources of inequality between firms: dispersion of firm pay premiums (“Firm effects”); sorting of
high earning workers into high paying firms (“Sorting”); and worker segregation which reflects
differences in the quality of the workforce across firms (“Segregation”). Both worker sorting
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and segregation reflect non-random allocation of workers to firms. However, sorting matters for
aggregate inequality, whereas segregation does not. This is because an increase in segregation
will be offset by a reduction in within-firm inequality. Thus, changes in segregation by itself does
not affect earnings inequality; it does, however, matter for the relative importance of inequality
within versus between firms.
To perform the decomposition in (9), we use exactly the same sample as in Table 3 which
includes both workers who move between firms and stayers. The results are presented in Table
4. In Panel A, we report the terms in the first equality. We find that around one-third of the
variance of log earnings can be accounted for by the dispersion of average earnings between
firms. The remainder is due to heterogeneity across workers within firms. A comparison of the
estimates across the two first columns suggests the between firm component has become slightly
more important for inequality over time. This finding is broadly consistent with the results
reported in Song et al. (2018).9
In the next two panels of Table 4, we use the procedures of AKM and BLM to estimate
the subcomponents from the second equality. There are three main findings from this analysis.
First, a vast majority of the inequality within firms can be accounted for by the observable
characteristics and the fixed effects of the workers. Indeed, only 16 percent of the within-firm
inequality reflects time-varying unobservables of the worker. Second, once one addresses limited
mobility bias then firm effects explain only 10 percent of the inequality between firms. By
comparison, sorting of high earning workers to high paying firms accounts for 40 percent while
the remaining 50 percent can be attributed to worker segregation that is unrelated to firm pay
premiums. Third, there seems to be little if any changes in the relative importance of firm
effects, worker sorting and segregation over the time intervals we consider.
Our finding of the inequality contribution from firm effects changing little over time is con-
sistent with Song et al. (2018), albeit their analysis uses AKM and thus suffers from limited
mobility bias. Table 4 reveals, however, that this bias does not change materially over the
time intervals we consider. As a result, bias correction seems to be empirically important for
accurately describing the cross-sectional distribution of earnings in the U.S., but not for under-
standing the growth in earnings inequality.10
3.3.2 Extensions
The assumptions that φij = xi + ψj and γ = Υ = 0 implies strong restrictions on the wage
structure. The absence of interactions between worker and firm effects rules out strong comple-
mentaries in production, as in Shimer and Smith (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011). The
9The analyses in Song et al. (2018) is based on data from 1978 to 2013. Over this longer time period, they
show that earnings inequality increased considerably, primarly due to a significant rise in the dispersion of average
earnings across firms. During the period we consider, however, Song et al. (2018) also report a modest increase
in earnings inequality, overall and between firms.
10Song et al. (2018) also argue that increases in sorting and segregation caused a large increase in between-firm
inequality from 1981 to 2013. At first sight, it would seem like this is inconsistent with our findings. However,
most of these increases happen before our data start. During the intervals since 2001 that we consider, Song
et al. (2018) report modest increases in the contributions to between-firm inequality from sorting and segregation
and a modest decrease from firm effects, consistent with our AKM estimates.
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Years: 2001-2008 2008-2015 Pooled
Panel A. Total Decomposition
Within Firm Share: V ar(wit − E[wit|j]) 67% 64% 66%
Between Firm Share: V ar(E[wit|j]) 33% 36% 34%
Panel B. AKM Decomposition
Shares of Within Firm Variance:
Worker Heterogeneity: V ar(xi +X
′
itb− E[xi +X ′itb|j]) 84% 85% 84%
Residual: V ar(it) 16% 15% 16%
Shares of Between Firm Variance:
Firm Effects: V ar(ψj) 27% 25% 26%
Segregation: V ar(E[xi +X ′itb|j]) 58% 59% 59%
Sorting: 2Cov(xi +X
′
itb, ψj) 15% 16% 15%
Panel C. BLM Decomposition
Shares of Within Firm Variance:
Worker Heterogeneity: V ar(xi +X
′
itb− E[xi +X ′itb|j]) 83% 84% 84%
Residual: V ar(it) 17% 16% 16%
Shares of Between Firm Variance:
Firm Effects: V ar(ψj) 10% 10% 10%
Segregation: V ar(E[xi +X ′itb|j]) 50% 50% 50%
Sorting: 2Cov(xi +X
′
itb, ψj) 40% 40% 40%
Table 4: Decomposition of Inequality Within and Between Firms using AKM and BLM
Notes: This table presents the decomposition of log earnings variation within and between firms using the
AKM and BLM estimators for two time intervals. The analysis uses both workers who move between firms and
stayers.
assumption of no pass through of firm and market shocks is at odds with our data and a large
body of evidence from many other developed countries. Thus, investigating these assumptions
seems important to draw credible conclusions about the functioning of the U.S. labor market.
Non-additivity and complementarities
The assumption that φij = xi + ψj implies that all workers who move from firm j to j′ will
experience an earnings change of ψj′ - ψj , no matter their quality xi. An informal way to assess
this log additive structure is to perform an event study of the earnings changes experienced by
workers moving between different types of firms. Card et al. (2013b) and Card et al. (2018)
use matched employer-employee data from Germany and Portugal to perform such event-study
analyses of the earnings changes experienced by workers moving between different types of firms.
In Online Appendix Figure B.3, we perform the same exercise, but this time for our U.S. data.
This analysis uses the movers sample. As in Card et al. (2013b) and Card et al. (2018), we
define firm groups based on the average pay of coworkers.
The results from the event study mirror those reported in Card et al. (2013b) and Card
et al. (2018). Workers who move to firms with more highly-paid coworkers experience earnings
raises, while those who move in the opposite direction experience earnings decreases of similar
magnitude. Additionally, the gains and losses for movers in opposite directions between any
two groups of firms are relatively symmetric. By comparison, earnings do not change materially
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when workers move between firms with similarly paid coworkers. Another relevant finding from
the event study is that the earnings profiles of the various groups are all relatively stable in
the years before and after a job move. This lends support to Assumption 2, as it suggests
that worker mobility does not seem to depend strongly on the trends in earnings beforehand or
afterwards. Lastly, it is interesting to observe that the gains and losses for movers seem to be
permanent. In contrast, in a large class of search models with job ladders, moves to firms that
currently pay less is rationalized by arguing that these firms will pay more in the future.
Although the event study results are consistent with the log additive functional form, we
cannot rule out interaction effects between worker and firm effects. Indeed, Bonhomme et al.
(2019) point out that even if the functional form is non-additive, the gains and losses may look
symmetric if workers making upward moves are of the same quality as those making downward
moves. More generally, the degree of asymmetry one observes in the event study depends both
on the magnitudes of any interaction effects and on the extent to which workers making upward
moves differ in quality from those making downward moves. Thus, the event study analysis
needs to be interpreted with caution.
To obtain an actual estimate of the importance of interactions between worker and firm
effects, we follow BLM in using the following model of earnings:
wit = θj(i,t) · xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
interaction
+ψj(i,t) + it (10)
which reduces to AKM when θj is the same for all firms. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 , we
obtain:
E[wit+1|j2 → j1]− E[wit|j1 → j2] = θj1 (E [xi|j2 → j1]− E [xi|j1 → j2])
E[wit+1|j1 → j2]− E[wit|j2 → j1] = −θj2 (E [xi|j2 → j1]− E [xi|j1 → j2])
where j1 → j2 (j2 → j1) is an indicator for a worker moving from firm 1 to 2 (firm 2 to 1). As
long as the workers moving from 1 to 2 are not exactly the same as those moving from 1 to 2,
the right hand side of these equalities are non-zero and we can recover θj1/θj2 from the moment
condition:
E[wit+1|j2 → j1]− E[wit|j1 → j2]




Thus, provided that the composition of movers differs across firms, it is possible to identify θj
(up to scale) for every firm. To take (10) to the data, however, it is useful to reduce the number
of parameters to estimate. As above, we follow BLM in classifying firms to ten types according
to the empirical earnings distribution within firms. Then we restrict θj to be the same for all
firms of a given type. We refer to Section 5.4 for details on the estimation procedure.
Figure 3 displays the estimated nonlinearities. We plot the means of log earnings for each
firm type and at 10 deciles of worker heterogeneity. On the x-axis, firm types are ordered in
ascending order, where “lower” and “higher” types refer to low and high mean log earnings. The
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Figure 3: Estimates of Interactions between Firm and Worker Effects using BLM
Notes: In this figure, we present estimates of interactions between firm and worker effects using the BLM
estimator. We plot the means of log earnings for each firm type and deciles of worker heterogeneity. On the
x-axis, firm types are ordered in ascending order, where “lower” and “higher” types refer to low and high mean
log earnings.
earn significantly more. For a given worker, there is also some variation in log earnings between
firm types, although to a lesser extent. As shown in equation (11), the parameters governing
nonlinearities are identified from comparing the gains from moving from a low to a high type
of firm for workers of different quality. As evident from Figure 3, the gains from such a move
are considerably larger for better workers. For example, moving from the lowest to the highest
type of firm increases earnings by 22, 47 and 78 percentage points for individuals at the 20, 50
and 80 percentile in the worker quality distribution.
The evidence of nonlinearities raises several questions. To what extent do interaction effects
bias the estimates from the log additive model? Are nonlinearities empirically important as
a source of earnings inequality? In Table 5, we investigate these questions by extending the
AKM decomposition to incorporate the contribution from interactions between worker and firm
effects. Re-arranging equation (10), we get







+ (θj(i,t) − θ¯)(xi − x¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
%ij(i,t)
+it (12)
where θ¯ ≡ E [θj(i,t)] and x¯ ≡ E [xi]. This equation decomposes the earnings of worker i in
period t into three distinct components: x˜i gives the direct effect of the quality of worker i
(evaluated at the average firm), ψ˜j(i,t) represents the direct effect of firm j (evaluated at the
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Model Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share explained by:
i) Worker Quality V ar(xi) 72.4% 70.4% 73.5% 71.6%
ii) Firm Effects V ar(ψj(i)) 3.2% 4.3% 3.0% 4.3%
iii) Sorting 2Cov(xi, ψj(i)) 12.9% 13.1% 12.8% 13.1%
iv) Interactions V ar(%ij) 3.0% 3.3%
+2Cov(xi + ψj(i), %ij) -1.8% -2.5%
v) Time-varying Effects V ar(ψj(i),t − ψj(i)) 0.3% 0.3%
+2Cov(xi, ψj(i),t − ψj(i))
Sorting Correlation: Cor(xi, ψj(i)) 0.43 0.38 0.43 0.37
Variance Explained: R2 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90
Specification:
Firm-Worker Interactions 7 X 7 X
Time-varying Firm Effects 7 7 X X
Table 5: Comparison of BLM Specifications
Notes: This table presents the decomposition of log earnings variation into firm and worker effects using the
BLM estimator for four specifications: baseline, allowing for worker effects to interact with firm effects
(“Firm-Worker Interactions”), allowing for a time-varying component in the firm effects due to the pass through
of value added shocks (“Time-varying Firm Effects”), and allowing for both interactions between firm and
worker effects and time-varying firm effects. The analysis uses both workers who move between firms and
stayers.
average worker), and %ij(i,t) captures the interaction effect between firm j and worker i quality.
Using equation (12), we obtain a new variance decomposition of log earnings:















x˜i + ψ˜j(i,t), %ij(i,t)
]
The first three components are informative about the inequality contribution from worker ef-
fects, firm effects and worker sorting, net of interaction effects. The last two components are
informative about the inequality contribution from interaction effects, as measured by the dis-
persion of %ij(i,t) across firms and the extent to %ij(i,t) is larger in firms with high wages. If
θj = θ¯ for every firm j, then these two components would be zero, and the decomposition in
(13) reduces to the standard AKM decomposition.
The results from the decomposition in (13) are presented in column (2) of Table 5. Our
estimates suggest the dispersion of interaction effects across firms explains three percent of the
earnings inequality. However, the total contribution to earnings inequality from nonlinearities
is muted by the interaction effects being larger in firms with higher paid workers. We also find
that omitting interaction effects causes a downward bias in the firm effects and an upward bias
in the worker effects.
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Pass through of shocks and time-varying types
The assumption that γ = Υ = 0 restricts firm effects to be constant over time. However, the
significant pass-through rates imply that firm effects actually evolve over time as employers
experience changes in the value added at the firm or market level. To capture this, we now let
γ differ from Υ and propose an adjustment to the AKM model which allows us to isolate the
time-invariant component of the firm effects.
Our approach proceeds in two steps. First, we construct an adjusted earnings measure by
removing the time-varying firm and market specific component of earnings. To do so, we use
the firm and market level value added multiplied by the estimated passthrough coefficients at
the firm and market level (see Table 2). Second, we recover the time-invariant firm and worker
effects by applying the methods of AKM or BLM to the adjusted measure of earnings. Consider
the following adjusted two-way specification for earnings of workers across firms:
E[wit − γ(yj(i,t),t − yj(i,t),1)− (Υ − γ)
(
y¯r(i,t),t − y¯r(i,t),1
) |j(i, 1), ..., j(i, T )] = xi + ψj .
The left-hand side removes the earnings dynamics due to passthrough of firm-specific shocks,
γ(yj(i,t),t− y¯r(i,t),t), and market shocks, Υ y¯r(i,t),t. What remains is the worker effect xi and the
time-invariant firm effect ψj , which can be estimated by applying AKM or BLM to the adjusted
earnings measure.
In column (3) of Table 5, we extend the BLM decomposition of the variance of log earnings
in (9) to incorporate the contribution from time-invariant and time-varying firm effects. We
find that time-varying firm effects explain little if any of the variation in log earnings, and that
the importance of firm effects and worker sorting do not change materially if we take the pass
through of firm shocks into account. Comparing the results in column (4) to those presented in
column (2) shows that time variation also has little to no explanatory power when accounting
for nonlinearities.
3.4 How the empirical findings inform our modeling choices
Before we present the model of the labor market, it is useful to explain how our modeling choices
are guided by the empirical findings reported above.
One of these findings is that most of the dispersion in firm average earnings is driven by
heterogeneity in the composition of workers who are employed at different firms. This finding
highlights the importance of allowing for heterogeneity in worker productivity and sorting in
the labor market. To accommodate this, we develop an equilibrium model of the labor market
with two-sided heterogeneity.
A related finding is the existence of firm wage premiums, although they explain relatively
little of the earnings inequality once one corrects for limited mobility bias. In the textbook model
of a perfectly competitive labor market, the law of one price holds and there should exist a single
market wage for a given quality of a worker, no matter the employer for which she works. Firm
wage premiums are at odds with this theory. To allow for firm effects, we let employers differ in
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workplace characteristics or amenities. Employers that offer favorable working conditions attract
labor at lower than average wages, whereas employers offering unfavorable working conditions
must pay premiums as offsetting compensation in order to attract labor.
Another important finding is that idiosyncratic value added shocks to a firm transmit to the
earnings of incumbent workers. To capture such a pass through, we will allow workers to have
heterogeneous preferences over the same amenities. As a result of this preference heterogeneity,
the employer faces an upward sloping supply curve for labor, implying that wage is an increasing
function of size. We will assume that employers do not observe the idiosyncratic taste for
amenities of any given worker. This information asymmetry implies that employers cannot
price discriminate with respect to workers’ reservation values. Instead, if a firm becomes more
productive and thus wants to increase its size, the employer must offer higher wages to all
workers.
A related finding is that the earnings of incumbent workers respond significantly less to an
idiosyncratic value added shock to the current firm than to a (same size) shock to all firms in
their current industry and area. One way to rationalize this finding is to partition the worker’s
choice set into “nests” by the industry and location of the firms, and allow that firms in the same
nest are closer substitutes in terms of their amenities than firms in other nests. This nested
structure on the workers’ preferences captures that many job characteristics are likely to vary
systematically both across areas and industries.
Another finding is that large differences in value added across firms do not create sizable firm
wage premiums. This finding would be expected if employers face perfectly elastic supply curves
for labor; a productive firm could then increase its size without raising wages. However, given
the evidence of upward sloping labor supply curves, one might expect sizable wage premiums
from being employed in more productive firms. To rationalize that the observed differences
in value added across firms do not create larger firm wage premiums, we allow for correlation
between the firms’ productivity and amenities. Such a correlation could, for example, arise
because productive firms invest in better amenities as a way to attract better workers, which
pushes down the wages that these firms have to pay and thus attenuates the wage premiums.
Lastly, the gains in log earnings from moving to higher paying firms are considerably larger
for better workers. These positive interaction effects are especially pronounced at the upper
tails of the distributions of worker and firm effects. To capture such interaction effects, we
allow for (but do not impose) production complementarities in the firm’s technology. Such
complementarities could help explain the pattern of sorting we observe in the data as they
incentivize better workers to sort into more productive firms, as in Shimer and Smith (2000)
and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011). A competing explanation for the sorting patterns would be
that high ability workers differ in how much they value amenities as compared to low ability
workers. By taking our model to the data, it is possible to quantify the strength and implications
of worker sorting based on workplace amenities versus production complementarities.
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4 Model of the labor market
This section develops a model of the labor market where multiple employers compete with one
another for workers who have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage job characteristics or
amenities.
4.1 Agents, preferences and technology
The economy is composed of a large number of workers indexed by i and a large set of firms
indexed by j = 1, ..., J . Each firm belongs to a market r(j). Let Jr denote the set of firms
in market r. We will rely on the approximation that firms employ many workers and that
each market has many firms. For tractability, we assume that workers, firms and markets face
exogenous birth-death processes which ensure stationarity in the productivity distributions of
workers, firms and markets.
Worker productivity and preferences
Workers are heterogeneous both in preferences and productivity. The productivity of worker i is
given by (Xi, Vit) where Xi is the permanent component and Vit is the time-varying component.
In period t, worker i has the following preferences over alternative firms j and earnings W :
uit(j,W ) = log τW
λ + logGj(Xi) + β
−1ijt (14)
where Gj(X) denotes the value that workers of quality X are expected to get from the amenities
that firm j offers, and ijt denotes worker i’s idiosyncratic taste for the amenities of firm j. The
parameters (τ, λ) describe the tax function that maps wages to income available for consumption.
In Section 5, we show how well this parsimonious tax function approximates the tax rates of
the US tax system.
The specification of preferences in equation (14) allows for the possibility that workers view
firms as imperfect substitutes. Fixing the permanent component of worker productivity X, the
preference term Gj(X) gives rise to vertical employer differentiation: some employers offer good
amenities while other employers have bad amenities. Our preference specification combines this
vertical differentiation with horizontal employer differentiation: workers are heterogeneous in
their preferences over the same firm. This horizontal differentiation has two distinct sources. The
first is that Gj(X) varies freely across values of X. Thus, we permit systematic heterogeneity in
the preferences for a given firm depending on the permanent component of worker productivity.
The second is the idiosyncratic taste component ijt. The importance of this second source of
horizontal differentiation is governed by the parameter β, which tells us the variability across
workers in the idiosyncratic taste for a given firm. Formally, this parameter is proportional to
the inverse of the standard deviation of ijt in log-dollars.
We assume that (i1t, ..., iJt) ≡ ~it ∼ Ψ(~|~it−1, Xi) follows a Markov process with indepen-
dent innovations across individuals with the same productivity X. This assumption does not
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imply strong restrictions on the copula (and, by extension, the patterns of mobility by worker
quality) over time. We assume, however, that the (cross-sectional) distribution of ~it has a
nested logit structure in each period:









This structure allows the preferences of a given worker to be correlated across alternatives within
each nest. In the empirical analysis, we specify the nest as the combination of industry and
area, and refer to it as a market. The parameter ρr measures of the degree of independence in a
worker’s taste for the alternative firms within market r, i.e. ρr =
√
1− corr(ijt, ij′t) if r(j) =
r(j′) = r. Thus, this parameter is equal to zero if each worker views firms within the same
market as perfect substitutes, while it is equal to one if the worker views these firms as completely
independent alternatives.
Firm productivity and technology
Importantly, we let firms differ not only in workplace amenities but also in terms of productivity
and technology. We start by introducing the total efficiency unit of labor at the firm:
Ljt =
∫∫
V ·Xθj ·Djt(X,V )dXdV,
where θj is a firm-specific parameter that determines the returns to labor permanent productivity
X, and Djt(X,V ) is the mass of workers with productivity (X,V ) demanded by the firm. The




where Ajt is the firm’s productivity (TFP), and αr(j) is the market-specific scale parameter.
This specification of the revenue production function abstracts from capital, or equivalently,
assumes that capital can be rented at some fixed price. However, the specification does not
require the product market to be competitive. As shown in Online Appendix C.5, it is possible
to derive the same specification of the revenue production function (and, by extension, labor
demand) if firms have price-setting power in the product market.
It is useful to express the productivity component Ajt as:
Ajt = A¯r(j)tA˜jt
= P¯r(j)Z¯r(j)tP˜jZ˜jt
where A¯r(j)t, P¯r(j), and Z¯r(j)t represent the overall, the permanent and the time-varying com-
ponents of productivity that are shared by all firms in market r, while A˜jt, P˜j and Z˜jt denote
the overall, the permanent and the time-varying components that are specific to firm j. Let




Wjt(X,V )Djt(X,V )dXdV denote the wage bill of the firm, i.e. the total sum of
wages paid to its workers. The profit of the firm is then given by Πjt = Yjt −Bjt.
Importantly, we do not restrict the relationship between amenities Gj(X), permanent pro-
ductivity components (P¯r(j), P˜j), and technology (θj , αr(j)). As a result, there are several reasons
why better workers may prefer to work in productive firms. One possible reason is that pro-
ductive firms (high A) could have better amenities (high G) and high wage workers (high X)
may value amenities more than low wage workers. Another possible reason is strong comple-
mentarities in production, as in Shimer and Smith (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011).
By letting θj vary across firms, the specification of technology permits such complementarities
between productive (high X) workers and productive (high A) firms.
4.2 Information, wages and equilibrium
We consider an environment where all labor is hired in a spot market and ijt is private infor-
mation to the worker. Hence, the wage may depend on the worker’s quality (X,V ), but not her
value of ijt. Given the set of offered wages Wt = {Wjt(X,V )}j=1,...,J by all firms, worker i
chooses a firm j to maximize his utility uit in each period:
j(i, t) ≡ arg max
j
uit(j,Wjt(Xi, Vit)). (15)













from which we can derive the probability that an individual of type (X,V ) chooses to work at














We consider an equilibrium where the firm views itself as infinitesimal within the market.
Thus, given the total mass of workers N and the stationary cross-sectional distributions of X
and V , MX(X) and MV (V ), employer j considers the following firm-specific labor supply curve
when setting wages Wjt(X,V ):













This means the firm ignores the negligible effect of changing its own wages on the market
level wage index Irt(X,V ). Then each firm chooses labor demand Djt(X,V ) by setting wages
Wjt(X,V ) for every type of worker (X,V ) to maximize profits subject to the labor supply
constraint Sjt(X,V,W ). For each firm j and time t,
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s.t. Djt(X,V )=Sjt(X,V,Wjt(X,V )) for each X,V (17)
Under these simplifying assumptions, the definition of the equilibrium naturally follows from
the presented environment:
Definition 1. Given firm characteristics (αr(j), Ajt, θj)j,t, worker distributionsN,MX(·),MV (·),
preference parameters (β, ρr, Gj(·)) and tax parameters (λ, τ), we define the equilibrium as the
worker decisions j(i, t), market level wage indices Irt(X,V ), firm-specific labor supply curves
Sjt(X,V,W ), wages Wjt(X,V ) and labor demand Djt(X,V ) such that:
i. Workers choose firms that maximize their utility, as defined in equation (15).
ii. Firms choose labor demand Djt(X,V ) by setting wagesWjt(X,V ) for every type of worker
(X,V ) to maximize profits subject to the labor supply constraint Sjt(X,V,W ), as de-
scribed in equation (17).
iii. The market level constants Irt(X,V ) are generated from the workers’ optimal decisions
j(i, t).
In Lemma 7 in Online Appendix C.1, we show the uniqueness of the equilibrium which proves
useful in the estimation of the model and is needed for the counterfactual analysis.
4.3 Structural equations
As shown in Proposition 1 in Online Appendix C.1, our model delivers the following structural
equations for wages, value added and wage bills for firm j ∈ Jr:


















where we use lower case letters to denote logs (e.g. x ≡ logX) and cr is a market-specific
constant that is equal to log (1−αr)λβ/ρr1+λβ/ρr . These equations describe how the potential outcomes
of workers and firms are determined, that is, they tell us the realization of wjt(x, v), bjt, and
yjt that would have been experienced had worker productivity (x, v), firm TFP a˜ and market
TFP a¯ been exogenously set.
The equations in (18)-(20) show that wj(x, v, a¯, a˜), bj(a¯, a˜), and yj(a¯, a˜) depend on the same
four components: the constant cr, the component of productivity that is specific to the firm a˜,
the component of productivity that is common to firms in the same market a¯, and an amenity
component hj . Comparing the wage equation to the other structural equations, we see that
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wj(x, v, a¯, a˜) also depends on the worker’s own productivity (x, v). Moreover, workers with the
same productivity are paid differently depending on the firm-specific parameter θj . As expected,
if a firm j becomes more productivity (a˜ or a¯ increase) then yj(a¯, a˜) increases. Because firm
j has become more productive, it will demand more labor, which raises wj(x, v, a¯, a˜), bj(a¯, a˜),
and yj(a¯, a˜).
From the structural wage equations, we also obtain:







where hj can be interpreted as the efficiency unit of labor the firm would have if a˜ and a¯ are
exogenously set to zero. This “TFP-neutral” notion of the total efficiency of labor depends on










The component g¯j is a weighted average of the X-specific amenities of firm j. It captures the
vertical differentiation of firms. All else equal, a greater g¯j raises the size of the firm, thus
increasing its wage bill and value added. At the same time, better amenities push down the
wages that these firms have to pay their workers, lowering wj(x, v). The other component of hj is
the average quality of the workers in the firm x¯j , reflecting sorting of workers to firms. If Gj(X)
increases by the same rate for each X in a given firm j, then g¯j increases while x¯j is unaffected.
Hence, x¯j captures that some firms may have relatively good amenities for some worker types.
All else equal, better co-workers raise the total labor efficiency of the firm’s workforce. With
decreasing return to scale in the production function (α > 0), this also lowers the wages that
firm j pays to a given worker.
Another important feature of the structural equations is that they are log additive in the
arguments θjx, a¯r(j)t, a˜jt, and hj . This log additivity is useful for several reasons. First, it
makes it straightforward to quantify the relative importance of the determinants of worker and
firm outcomes. Second, it forges a direct link between the structural wage equation and the
two-way fixed effect models discussed in Section 3.3. This link will help interpret the variance
decomposition of AKM and BLM through the lens of the model. Third, it makes it possible to
prove identification of the parameters of the model, as shown in Section 5.
4.4 Rents, compensating differentials, and allocative inefficiencies
We conclude the presentation of the model by defining the rents that workers and employers earn
from ongoing employment relationships and explaining how these quantities relate to reservation
wages, compensating wage differentials, and allocative inefficiencies.
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Worker rents
In our model, rents are due to the idiosyncratic taste component ijt which gives rise to horizontal
differentiation of firms, upward sloping labor supply curves, and employer wage setting power.
We assumed that employers do not observe the idiosyncratic taste for amenities of any given
worker. This information asymmetry implies that firms cannot price-discriminate with respect
to workers’ reservation wages. As a result, the equilibrium allocation of workers to firms creates
surpluses or rents for inframarginal workers, defined as the excess return over that required to
change a decision, as in Rosen (1986). In our model, worker rents may exist at both the firm
and the market level:
Result 1. We define the firm level rents of worker i, Rwit, as the surplus he derives from being
inframarginal at his current choice of firm. Given his equilibrium choice j(i, t), Rwit is implicitly
defined by:




As shown in Lemma 9 in the Online Appendix, the expected worker rents at the firm level is
given by:
E [Rwit|j(i, t)=j] =
1
1 + λβ/ρr(j)
E [Wjt(Xi, Vit)|j(i, t)=j] .
Result 2. We define the market level rents of worker i, Rwmit , as the surplus derived from
being inframarginal at his current choice of market. Given his equilibrium choice r(j(i, t)), Rwmit
is implicitly defined by:




As shown in Lemma 9 in the Online Appendix, the expected worker rents at the market level is
given by:
E [Rwmit |j(i, t)=j] =
1
1 + λβ
E [Wjt(Xi, Vit)|j(i, t)=j]
Market level rents exceed firm level rents whenever the next best firm is in the same market
as the current choice of firm. If the preferences of a given worker are independent across firms
within each market, then the next best firm will almost surely be in a different market. If, on
the other hand, these preferences are correlated then there could well exist other firms within
the same market that are close substitutes to the current firm. The next best firm may then
very well be in the same market as the current choice of firm, in which case Rwmit will exceed
Rwit.
To interpret the measure of firm level rents and link it to compensating differentials, it is
useful to express Rwit in terms of reservation wages. The worker’s reservation wage for his current
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choice of firm is defined as the lowest wage at which he would be willing to continue working in
this firm. Substituting in preferences in the above definition of Rwit, we get:
logWj(i,t),t(Xi, Vit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current wage
− log (Wj(i,t),t(Xi, Vit)−Rwit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
reservation wage
=
logWj(i,t),t(Xi, Vit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current wage
− logWjo(i,t),t(Xi, Vit)︸ ︷︷ ︸









λβ ijo(i,t)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
amenities at best outside option
(22)
The average worker choosing firm j may be far from the margin of indifference and would
maintain the same choice even if his current firm offered significantly lower wages. The same
thing holds true for the average worker choosing any other firm. The difference between the
reservation wage and the actual wage is the rent earned by a person at his current choice of
firm.
Compensating differentials
By definition, the marginal workers are indifferent between the current choice of firm and the
next best option. They earn no rents as their reservation wages equal the actual wages paid
by their current firms. By solving equation (22) for workers for whom reservation wages are
equal to current wages, it becomes clear that the market wage differences are informative about
the preferences for amenities of these marginal workers. Another way of saying this is that
the equilibrium allocation of workers to firms is such that utility gains (or losses) of marginal
workers due to the amenities of their firms are exactly offset by market wage differences. Thus,
the market wage differences across firms define the equalizing or compensating wage differentials:
Result 3. The compensating differential between firm j and firm j′ for workers of type
(X,V ) is defined as
CDjj′t(X,V ) = uit(j,Wjt(X,V ))− uit(j′,Wjt(X,V )) s.t.Rwit = 0
= logWjt(X,V )− logWj′t(X,V )
= (θj − θj′)x+ ψjt − ψj′t
where the last equality follows directly from equation (18) and






For any two firms j and j′, there exists a distribution of compensating differentials. This dis-
tribution arises not because of heterogeneous tastes of workers, but because of differences in
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technology across firms. If θj does not vary across firms, there is only one compensating differ-
ential per employer. It is given by the firm effect ψjt, which is paid to all workers independent
of their productivity.
Employer rents
The equilibrium allocation of workers to firms may also create surpluses or rents for employers.
The employer rents arise because of the additional profit the firm can extract by taking advantage
of its wage setting power. To measure employer rents, we therefore compare the profit Πjt the
firm actually earns to what it would have earned if the employer solved the firm’s problem
under the assumption that the labor supply it faces is perfectly elastic. In other words, wages,
profits and employment are such that Dptjt (X,V ) solves the firm’s profit maximization taking
W ptjt (X,V ) as given:
Πptjt = max{Dptjt (X,V )}(X,V )
Ajt
(∫∫




Dptjt (X,V )·W ptjt (X,V )dXdV,
where the labor demand and the wages also have to clear:
Sjt(X,V,W
pt
jt (X,V )) = D
pt
jt (X,V ) for all t, j,X, V.
The only difference in this counterfactual environment is that the firm does not take into account
its wage setting power through the upward-sloping labor supply curve. In other words, the firm
behaves as if it faces a perfectly elastic labor supply curve, i.e. as if it was a “price taker”; thus




jt (X,V ) as the equilibrium
outcome when all firms in a market act as price takers.
Result 4. We define the employer rents at the firm level Rfjt and at market level R
fm
jt as the
additional profit firm j derives from the presence of inframarginal workers. Given our previous
definitions:
Rfjt = Πjt −Πptjt
=








Rfmjt = Πjt −Πptmjt
=





)− (1−αr(j))λβ1+αr(j)λβ Πjt (24)
where the last equality in (23) and in (24) are shown in Lemma 10 and 11 in the Online
Appendix.
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It is important to observe that Rfjt and R
fm
jt do not necessarily represent ex-ante rents. Suppose,
for example, that each employer initially chooses the amenities offered to the workers by deciding
on the firm’s location, the working conditions, or both. Next, the employers compete with one
another for the workers who have heterogeneous preferences over the chosen amenities. These
heterogeneous preferences give rise to wage setting power which employers can use to extract
additional profits or rents. Of course, the existence of such ex-post rents could simply be returns
to costly choices of amenities.
Empirically, it is difficult to credibly distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post employer rents.
It would require information (or assumptions) about how firms choose and pay for the amenities
offered to workers. Given our data, we are severely limited in the ability to distinguish between
ex-ante and ex-post rents. Instead, we assume that firms are endowed with a fixed set of
amenities, or, more precisely, we restrict amenities to be fixed over the estimation window. It is
important to note what is not being restricted under this assumption. First, it does not restrict
whether or how amenities Gj(X) relate to the technology parameters αr, θj or the productivity
components P¯r(j) and P˜j . Second, it neither imposes nor precludes that employers initially
choose amenities to maximize profits. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that permitting
firms to initially choose amenities would not affect any of our estimates. Nor would it matter
for the interpretation of any result other than whether Rfjt and R
fm
jt should be viewed as ex-ante
or ex-post rents.
Wedges and allocative inefficiencies
We conclude the model section by investigating the questions of whether and in what situations
the equilibrium allocation of workers to firms will be inefficient. We here present the key
results, and refer to Online Appendix C.7 for details and derivations. To draw conclusions about
allocative inefficiencies, we compare the allocation and outcomes in the monopsonistic labor
market to those that would arise in a competitive (Walrasian) labor market. By a competitive
market, we mean that there are no taxes (λ = τ = 1) and that all firms act as price takers,
as if they face perfectly elastic labor supply curves. To simplify the expressions, we abstract
from the transitory term Vit. This simplification does not affect the analysis as Vit cancels out
because it is paid to the worker independent of the choice of firm.
We begin by examining how the firm’s problem and solution differ in the two types of labor
markets. In the competitive market, firms will hire workers until the marginal revenue product
of labor equals the wage rate. Thus, the first order condition of the firm is given by:
W cjt(X) = X
θj (1− αr(j))Ajt(Lcjt)−αr(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal product of labor: Mcjt(X)
where the superscript cmakes clear that we refer to the competitive market case. By comparison,
when the firm behaves as a local monopsonist, the wages are marked down relative to the
marginal revenue product of labor.
To understand when, and by how much, firms mark down wages, it is useful to rewrite the
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· Xθj (1− αr(j))AjtL−αr(j)jt︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal product of labor: Mjt(X)
. (25)
Consider the special case when ρr is zero for every r, which means that workers view all firms
within each market as perfect substitutes. As a result, firms would face horizontal labor supply
curves. Thus, wages would be paid at a level equal to the marginal revenue product of labor,
implying no labor wedges. If, on the other hand, ρr differs from zero, then firms within the
same market are viewed as imperfect substitutes by the workers. Thus, they have wage setting
power and workers are paid less than their marginal product. The steeper the labor supply
curve facing the firm, the larger the labor wedges. The labor supply curve is steeper, the more
important the amenities are for worker’s choice of firms. Therefore, labor wedges increase in the
variability of the idiosyncratic tastes β−1 and in the progressivity of labor income taxes (1−λ).
We now shift attention to the worker’s problem and solution in the two types of labor
markets. But first, it is useful to express wages using the wage index Irt(X) from equation (16)











Equation (26) allows us to derive parsimonious expressions for the supply of workers to markets
and to firms within a market. In the competitive labor market, we get












, X, j ∈ Jr]
= Gj(X)
β/ρr(j)W˜cjt(X)β/ρr(j)
and in the monopsonistic labor market we obtain:
S¯rt(X) = NPr[j(i, t) ∈ Jr| {Wjt(X)}j=1,...,J , X]
= NW¯rt(X)λβ
S˜jt(X) = Pr[j(i, t) = j| {Wjt(X)}j=1,...,J , X, j ∈ Jr]
= Gj(X)
β/ρr(j)W˜jt(X)λβ/ρr(j)
Comparing these expressions shows the tax wedge in the worker’s choice of where to work.
Progressive taxation (i.e. λ < 1) may distort the worker’s decision of which market and firm to
work in. The reason is that wages are taxed but amenities are not. Thus, progressive taxation
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makes amenities relatively more important for the workers’ choice of where to work.
While the discussion above clarifies the sources of wedges in the problems of the worker and
the firm, it does not directly speak to the questions of whether, and in what situations, the
equilibrium allocation of workers to firms will be inefficient. To answer these questions, we need
to examine how the labor and tax wedges play out in equilibrium. To do so, it is useful to






























while in the monopsonistic labor market we obtain:







D˜jt(X) = S˜jt(X) = Gj(X)
β/ρr(j)M˜λβ/ρr(j)jt
Comparing these expressions allows us to draw inferences about allocative inefficiencies within
and between markets.
Within each market, the tax wedge that arise because λ < 1 is the only source of allocative
inefficiency, distorting the worker’s ranking of firms in favor of those with better amenities. As a
result, these firms can hire workers at relatively low wages, and, therefore, get too many workers
as compared to the allocation in the competitive labor market.
Between markets, allocative inefficiencies may arise not only because of the tax wedge but
also due to differences in labor wedges across markets. To understand the latter source of
inefficiencies, consider the special case when λ = 1, β > 0 and ρr is non-zero but the same across
all markets. In this case, taxes are proportional but there are still labor wedges and rents in
the economy. However, the labor wedges will be the same across all markets. As a consequence,
the monopsonistic market allocation of workers to firms is identical to the allocation one would
obtain in the competitive equilibrium. A corollary of this results is that tax wedges are the only
source of allocative inefficiencies if one assumes a standard logit structure on the distribution of
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~it (as in, for example, Card et al., 2018).
With the nested logit structure on the distribution of ~it, allocative inefficiencies across
markets may arise because ρr can vary across markets, implying that workers may view firms
as closer substitutes in some markets than others. This will create differences across markets in
the wage setting power of firms, and so in their abilities to mark down wages. Markets facing
an elastic labor supply curve (i.e. low value of ρr) will have relatively high wages and, as a
result, attract too many workers compared to the allocation in the competitive equilibrium.
Progressive taxation will amplify any differences in ρr across markets, leading to an even larger
misallocation of workers to firms.
To improve the allocation of workers to firms, the government can change the tax system in
two ways. First, a less progressive tax system (i.e. increase λ) may reduce the misallocation that
arises from the tax wedge. Second, letting τ vary across markets may improve the allocation of
workers by counteracting differences in the wage setting power of firms. After estimating the
parameters of the model, we perform counterfactuals that quantifies the impacts of such tax
reforms on the equilibrium allocation and outcomes, including earnings, output and welfare.
5 Identification and estimation
We now describe how the quantities of interest are identified and estimated. We provide a formal
identification argument while summarizing, in Table 6, the parameters needed to recover a given
quantity of interest and the moments used to identify these parameters. Our identification
argument reveals that many of these quantities do not require knowledge of all the structural
parameters. Thus, some of our findings may be considered more reliable than others.
5.1 Parameters needed to recover rents of workers and employers
As shown in Results 1, 2 and 4, we only need to know (αr, β, ρr) to draw inference about
the expected rents of workers and employers at the firm and market level. Our identification
argument therefore proceeds by showing how these parameters can be identified from the panel
data on workers and firms. However, before we present the formal identification argument,
it is useful to consider what one can and cannot identify directly from an ideal experiment.
This consideration clarifies the necessary assumptions even with an ideal experiment and the
additional ones needed because we do not have such an experiment.
Ideal experiment
Suppose we observed and were able to exogenously change both a˜, the component of productivity
that is specific to a firm, and a¯, the component of productivity that is common to all firms in
a market. As evident from the structural equations (18)-(20), exogenous changes in a˜ and a¯
affect both the firm’s value added yj(a¯, a˜) and the wages it offers to workers of a given quality
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wj(x, v, a¯, a˜):


















Since λ is a known (or pre-estimated) tax parameter, β and ρr(j) can be identified from these
two equations.
In this ideal experiment, the pass-through to wj(x, v, a¯, a˜) of an a¯ induced change in the
yj(a¯, a˜) would identify β. Given this parameter, the pass-through to wj(x, v, a¯, a˜) of an a˜
induced change in value added would identify ρr(j). Next, one could recover αr by combining
the structural equations (18)-(20) to get:






This equation shows that the market-specific scale parameter can be recovered from data on







It is important to observe that performing such an ideal experiment is difficult for several
reasons. First, it can be difficult to find shifters or instruments for a˜ and a¯ that are both as good
as randomly assigned to firms and have skill-neutral impacts on productivity. Existing studies
using instruments have either a shifter for a˜ or a shifter for a¯, but not both.11 Second, even if the
analyst finds such instruments, it is necessary to keep amenities fixed. In other words, firms must
not change the amenities offered to workers in response to shifts in productivity. Otherwise,
value added would not be the only channel through which a˜ and a¯ would affect wages. Third,
the analyst needs to observe worker quality or make restrictions on worker mobility in response
to shocks to firm productivity. Otherwise, the productivity effects on the wages the firm pays
to workers of a given quality may be confounded by shifts in the quality of the workforce of the
firm.
Panel data approach
Since we do not have such an ideal experiment, we instead have to rely on panel data on workers
and firms. We now show how these data can be used to identify the structural parameters
(αr, β, ρr). We begin by describing the restrictions on the primitives that deliver the statistical
processes for wages and value added. This forges a direct link between our model of the labor
market in Section 4 and the pass through analysis in Section 3.2. Once this link is established,
11See, for example, Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Van Reenen (1996), Kline et al. (2018a), Garin and Silvério
(2019), and Berger et al. (2019). If one only has an instrument for a˜, it would still be possible to achieve
identification by assuming that ρr is zero for every market r, which means that workers view all firms within
each market as perfect substitutes. However, our data are at odds with this assumption. If, on the other hand,
one only has an instrument for a¯, then identifying the labor supply curve facing the firm seems difficult, even
with additional assumptions.
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we proceed by showing how the estimates from the pass-through analysis can be used to recover
the structural parameters.
The starting point is the structural equations (18)-(20) that express wages wj(x, v, a¯, a˜) and
value added yj(a¯, a˜) as functions of primitives that are fixed over time Γ = (p¯r, p˜j , gj(x), xi) and
those that vary over time (z¯rt, z˜jt, vit). We begin by specifying how the time-varying components










where the persistent component vpit is a unit root process with innovation shocks µit, and the
transitory component is assumed to follow a MA(1) process with coefficients δx and innovation
variance σ2x. We assume that firm productivity evolves as a unit root process at both the firm
level:
a˜jt = p˜j + z˜jt
z˜jt = z˜jt−1 + u˜jt
and the market level:
a¯rt = p¯r + z¯rt
z¯rt = z¯rt−1 + u¯rt.
On top of this, we allow for measurement error in the observed value added in the form of
a transitory component that follows an MA(1) process. This gives the following relationship







where δy is the MA coefficient and σ2y is variance of ξ
y
jt.
After specifying these processes, it is necessary to invoke some restrictions on the relationship
between the primitives. Letting the history of time-varying unobservables at time t be denoted
by Ωt ≡ {u˜jt′ , u¯rt′ , ξxit′ , ξyjt′ , µit′ , ijt′}i,j,r,t′≤t, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. Assume that each of the random variables u˜jt′ , u¯rt′ , ξxit′ , ξ
y
jt′ , µit are drawn i.i.d.
conditional on Ωt−1 and Γ.
It is important to observe what is and is not being restricted by Assumption 3. It permits
arbitrary correlation between the components of Γ. Thus, our model allows for rich hetero-
geneity of both firms and workers, and systematic sorting of different workers into different
firms. However, Assumption 3 implies that worker-specific innovations to productivity are both
independent across coworkers and orthogonal to innovations to firm productivity, as well as
orthogonal to idiosyncratic taste realizations ijt. Moreover, worker-specific innovations to pro-
ductivity do not induce mobility because they are paid to the worker independent of the choice
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of firm. This is key to identifying the pass-through rates of firm shocks by looking at changes
over time in the earnings of incumbent workers. Another important implication of Assumption
3 is that innovations to firm productivity are independent of the endowment of firm amenities.
This is crucial for learning about innovations to the firm’s productivity from changes in its value
added over time.
In Online Appendix D.1, we show that Assumption 3 together with the structural equations








This establishes that the parameters (β, ρr) are identified under Assumption 3. Furthermore,
it shows how the model of the labor market provides a structural interpretation of the pass-
through rates reported in Section 3.2 in terms of expected worker rents at the firm level and at
the market level. Once (β, ρr) are known, we can recover αr (and therefore, the expected firm
rents) from data on wage bills and value added per market, as shown in equation (30)
5.2 Parameters needed to economically interpret AKM
The empirical analysis in Section 3.3 decomposes earnings inequality into components that are
meant to capture worker heterogeneity, firm wage premiums and worker sorting. Our model
offers an economic interpretation of this statistical decomposition. For this purpose, we not
only need to know (αr, β, ρr) but also (θj , p¯r, p˜j , σ2u˜, σ
2
u¯, hj , xi).
Given the above restrictions on the primitives, we can recover θj and a firm-specific time
invariant intercept ψj from the analysis of cross-sectional earnings inequality in Section 3.3. As
in this analysis, we remove the time-varying firm- and market-specific components of earnings,
so that one can express the expected earnings of worker i in firm j as a the sum of her own









∣∣∣∣ j(i, t)=j, j ∈ Jr] = θjxi + ψj (31)
where for j ∈ Jr we define:
ψj ≡ cr − αrhj − λβ(ρr − 1)(1− αr)
(1 + λβ)(ρr + β)
h¯r. (32)
This derivation is presented in Online Appendix D.2. The firm-specific component ψj depends
only on the amenities components, hj and h¯r = E [hj | j ∈ Jr]. In contrast to ψjt defined before,
this ψj does not depend on time t firm level and market level productivities a¯rtand a˜jt. Under
the rank condition that workers moving to a firm are not of the exact same quality as workers
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moving from the firm:
E [xi|j(i, t)=j, j(i, t+1)=j′] 6= E [xi|j(i, t)=j′, j(i, t+1)=j]
we can identify both θj and ψj from data on the changes in earnings associated with these
moves. Given these parameters, we can recover worker quality xi from equation (31) and hj
from equation (32).
Knowing xi, hj and θj for each worker and firm, we can recover the productivity components














The intuition is straightforward. Conditional on the amenity component hj , we recover firm
productivity a˜jt by comparing `jt across firms within the same market. Holding market ameni-
ties fixed, we identify a¯rt by comparing total efficiency units of labor of different markets. Once
we know (a¯rt, a˜jt), we can recover (p¯r, p˜j , σ2u˜, σ
2
u¯) from the assumptions about how productivity
evolves at the firm and market level.
5.3 Parameters needed for welfare and counterfactuals
To make inference about welfare and to perform counterfactuals, it is necessary to also recover
the preferences componentGj(X). This is done through a revealed preference argument: Holding
wages fixed, firms with favorable amenities (for a given type of worker) are able to attract more
workers (of that type). Conditional on wages, the size and composition of firms and markets
should therefore be informative about unobserved amenities.
We formalize this intuition in Lemma 13 in Online Appendix D.3, showing that Gj(X) can
be identified from data on the allocation of workers to firms and markets. We first derive the













is the probability that workers of quality X choose to work in mar-
ket r, while Pr [j(i, t)=j|X, r=r(j)] is the probability these workers choose to work for firm
j conditional on selecting market r. Consider two firms j and j′ in the same market r. The
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differences in size and composition of these firms depend on the gaps in wages and amenities:
λ ((θj − θj′)xi + ψj − ψj′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage gap







Pr [j(i, t)=j |X, r(j)=r]
Pr [j(i, t)=j′ |X, r(j′)=r]︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative size by worker type
.
Since both the wage gap and the within-market elasticity are already identified, we can recover
the value of amenities up to a common market factor by comparing the size and composition of
firms. Comparing firms across markets allow us to pin down the market factor.
5.4 Estimation
The estimation procedure follows closely the identification arguments laid out above. In the es-
timation, however, we impose a few additional restrictions on the heterogeneity of workers, firms
and markets. Neither of these restrictions are necessary for identification, but they help reduce
the number of parameters to estimate. We now describe these restrictions before presenting the
parameter estimates and assessing the fit of the model.
Specification of empirical model
We begin by restricting the market-specific parameters αr and ρr to be the same within broad
markets (as defined in Section 2). The restriction on αr means the scale parameter can vary
freely across, but not within, broad regions and sectors of the economy. The assumption on ρr
restricts the nested logit structure of the preferences. Recall that the parameter ρr measures
the degree of independence in a worker’s taste for alternative firms within the nest. We specified
the nest as the combination of commuting zone and two-digit industry. We now restrict the
parameter ρr to be the same for all nests within each broad market. As a result, labor wedges
may vary across, but not within, broad regions and sectors.
A second set of restrictions is that we draw the firm-specific components θj and ψj from
a discrete distribution. We follow Bonhomme et al. (2019) in using a two-step grouped fixed-
effects estimation, which consists of a classification and an estimation step. In a first step, firms
are classified into groups indexed by k based on the empirical earnings distribution using the
k-means clustering algorithm. The k-means classification groups together firms whose earnings
distributions are most similar.12 Then, in a second step, we estimate the parameters θk(j) and
ψk(j). In the baseline specification, we assume there exist 10 firm types. We view the assumption
of discrete heterogeneity as a technique for dimensionality reduction in the estimation, instead
of viewing discreteness as a substantive assumption about population unobservables. It is reas-
suring to find that the estimates of firm effects do not change materially if we instead allow for
12Here, we follow Bonhomme et al. (2019). Concretely, we use a weighted k-means algorithm with 100 randomly
generated starting values. We use the firms’ empirical distributions of log-earnings on a grid of 10 percentiles of
the overall log-earnings distribution.
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20, 30, 40 or 50 firm types (see e.g. Online Appendix Figure B.4).
Lastly, we also make the following discreteness assumption for the systematic components
of firm amenities:
Gj(X) = G¯r(j)G˜jGk(j)(X),
where we define the firm class k(j) within market r using the classification of Section 3 interacted
with the market. This multiplicative structure reduces the number of parameters we need
to estimate while allowing for systematic differences in amenities across firms and markets
(G˜j , G¯r(j)) and heterogeneous tastes according to the quality of the workerGk(j)(X). As a result,
amenities may still generate sorting of better workers to productive firms, and compensating
differentials may still vary across firms, markets and workers, and heterogeneity in amenities.
For estimation purposes, we take advantage of the derivations in Online Appendix D.3, which
express the preference components (G¯r(j)G˜jGk(j)(X)) as functions of the size and composition




















Pr[j(i, t) ∈ Jr |X] = G¯βr








where G˜β/ρj and G¯
β
r(j) are estimated by iterating on the expression above. In this estimation of
Gj(X), we rely on a discretization of X using 10 points of support and we also group markets
into 10 different market types based on their realized empirical distribution of earnings.
Estimates and fit
Consider first the parameters of the tax function, τ and λ. We estimate these parameters outside
the model. In each year, we regress log net household income (earnings plus other income
minus taxes) on log household gross income (earnings plus other income) for our sample. The
construction of these income measures is detailed in Online Appendix A. The intercept from this
regression gives us τ while λ is identified from the slope coefficient. We estimate τ of around
0.89 whereas λ is estimated to be about 0.92.13 In a proportional tax-transfer system, λ is equal
to one and (1− τ) is the proportional effective tax rate. By contrast, if 0 < λ < 1, then the
marginal effective tax rate is increasing in earnings. Online Appendix Figure B.6 shows how
well our parsimonious tax function approximates the effective tax rates implicit in the complex
U.S. tax-transfer system. Here we compare the predicted log net income from the regression
13These results mirror closely existing U.S. estimates of τ and λ (see e.g. Guner et al., 2014, Heathcote et al.,
2017).
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to the observed log net income across the distribution of log gross income, finding that this
specification provides an excellent fit.
Once we have the tax parameters, we can estimate the other parameters following the iden-
tification arguments above. In other words, we substitute the sample moments in place of the
population moments. Table 6 summarizes the estimates of key parameters. On average, we find
αr to be around 0.21, suggesting declining returns to labor input. The estimate of β is about
4.99. This finding suggests considerable variability across workers in the idiosyncratic taste for
a given firm. On average, we estimate ρr to be about 0.70. This implies a correlation of 0.51
in the taste of the worker across firms in the same industry and location. The variation in
worker quality is empirically important, whereas the time-varying firm premia vary less. Firms
differ significantly in their technology, productivity and amenities. A considerable part of the
productivity dispersion is across markets.
Because we allow for a lot of heterogeneity across workers and firms, our model fits perfectly
many aspects of the data. However, some moments of the data are not necessarily matched
that well. In Figure 4, we compare the observed and the predicted values of firm effects, value
added, efficiency units of labor, and wage bill. We make this comparison separately according
to the actual and predicted firm size. When considering these moments (which are not directly
targeted), the model performs well.
In Figure 5, we take advantage of the fact that the amenity component hj is over-identified.
One possibility is to recover it from the equation for firm wage premiums (32), as we did in
the estimation. Another possibility is to use the fixed-point definition of hj as a function of
(P˜j , P¯r, Gj(X)), as shown in Lemma 8. This definition comes from the equilibrium constraint
of the model, which we do not directly use in the estimation. Figure 5 shows that the values of
hj based on equation (32) are very similar to those we obtain from the equilibrium constraint
of the model. This finding increases our confidence in the moment conditions implied by our
economic model.
6 Empirical insights from the model
We now present the empirical insights from the estimated model. These insights require an
explicit model of the labor market, and, thus, they may be susceptible to model misspecification.
As shown in Section 5, however, many of the insights do not require knowledge of all the
structural parameters. Thus, some of our findings may be considered more reliable than others.
To make this clear, we first present the findings that rely on the least assumptions and then
move to those that require additional restrictions on the functioning of the labor market.
6.1 Rents and and labor wedges
Table 7 presents estimates of the size of rents earned by American firms and workers from
ongoing employment relationships. In the first column of the table, we estimate these quantities













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Fit of the Model for Untargeted Moments
Notes: In this figure, we compare the observed and the predicted values of firm effects, value added, efficiency
units of labor, and wage bill. We make this comparison separately according to the actual and predicted firm
size.
all firms in every market. In the second and third column we relax these restrictions, allowing
for the possibility that technology differs across markets and that workers view firms within
the same market as closer substitutes than firms in different markets. To easily compare the
estimates from the baseline specification (in the second and third column) to those produced by
the restricted specification (in the first column), we report national averages and refer to Online
Appendix Table B.3 for the market-specific results.
In both specifications, we find evidence of significant amount of rents and imperfect compe-
tition in the U.S. labor market due to the horizontal employer differentiation. When we impose
the restrictions on αr and ρr, we estimate that workers are, on average, willing to pay 14 percent
of their annual earnings to stay in their current jobs. This corresponds to $5,875 per worker. By
comparison, firms earn, on average, 11 percent of profits from rents (with profits being measured
as value added minus the wage bill). This amounts to $5,932 per worker in the firm. These
results imply that the rents from imperfect competition in the labor market are split equally
between the employers and the workers.
Comparing the results across the columns of Table 7 shows that relaxing the restrictions on






























































Figure 5: Estimates of the Amenity Components hj from the Wage Equation versus the Equi-
librium Constraint
Notes: In this figure, we plot the mean of hj across log size bins. We compare the baseline estimates of hj from
the equation for firm wage premiums (32), versus those estimated using the equilibrium constraint by solving
the fixed-point definition of hj as a function of (P˜j , P¯r, Gj(X)), as shown in Lemma 8.
total rents. Yet relaxing these restrictions is still important for the conclusions we draw about
the labor market. One insight from the second and third column is that the market level rents
are considerably larger than the firm level rents. The workers are, on average, willing to pay
$7,331 (18 percent of their annual earnings) to avoid having to work for a firm in a different
market. By way of comparison, the average willingness to pay to remain in the current firm is
only $5,447 (13 percent of earnings). The relatively large market level rents reflect that firms
within the same market are more likely to be close substitutes than firms in different markets.
By relaxing the restrictions on ρr, we also learn that labor wedges are significant and vary
substantially across markets. In Figure 6, we report the estimates of labor wedges from the
baseline specification. On average, the marginal revenue product of labor is 15 percent higher
than the wage. Behind this average, however, there is important variation. Empirically, the
labor wedges are most pronounced in the goods sector (which have higher values of ρr). In the
West, for example, the labor wedge is 6 percentage points larger for firms in the goods sector as
compared to those in the service sectors.
6.2 Compensating differentials
The estimates of rents suggest the average American worker is far from the margin of indifference
in his choice of firm, and would, in fact, maintain the same choice even if his current firm offered
significantly lower wages. In other words, the average worker would, if asked, identify amenities
as important to his choice of firm. This finding does not, however, imply that the marginal
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Rents and Rent-shares
Firm Only Accounting for Markets
Firm-level Firm-level Market-level
Workers’ Rents:
Per-worker Dollars 5,875 5,447 7,331
(284) (395) (1,234)
Share of Earnings 14% 13% 18%
(1%) (1%) (3%)
Firms’ Rents:
Per-worker Dollars 5,932 5,780 7,910
(709) (1,547) (1,737)
Share of Profits 11% 11% 15%
(1%) (3%) (3%)
Workers’ Share of Rents 50% 49% 48%
(2%) (4%) (3%)
Table 7: Estimates of rents and rent sharing (national averages)
Notes: This table displays our main results on rents and rent-sharing. Column 1 presents results from the
specification which imposes Υ = γ, ρr = 1, and αr = α (“Firm only”), while columns 2-3 report results from the
specification which allows Υ to differ from γ, and for ρr and αr to vary across broad markets (“Accounting for
Markets”). Standard errors are estimated using 40 block bootstrap draws in which the block is taken to be the
market.
workers view the amenities of the current firm as much better or much worse than those offered
by other firms. To gauge the preferences for amenities of the marginal workers, we estimate the
average or expected compensated differential.
The estimates of the expected compensating differentials are displayed in Figure 7. To
estimate these quantities, we randomly draw two firms, j and j′ , from the overall distribution of
firms (where each firm is drawn with probability proportional to its size). We then compute the
compensating differentials between j and j′ for a worker of given quality x as ψj+xθj−ψj′−xθj′ .
We repeat this procedure for a large number of draws of firms.
The solid horizontal line in Figure 7 shows the average or expected compensating differential
for a marginal worker. For two randomly drawn firms, the one with worse amenities can be
expected to pay an additional 18 percent in order to convince marginal workers (of average
quality) to accept the job. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity in the compensating
differentials according to worker quality. The upward sloping solid line shows how the expected
compensating differential varies with worker quality. For high quality workers (95 percentile in
the national distribution), the expected compensating differentials are as large as 30 percent. By
comparison, marginal workers of low quality (5 percentile in the national distribution) require
less than 10 percent additional pay to work in the firm with the unfavorable amenities.



















Figure 6: Labor Wedges
Notes: In this figure, we display the estimated labor wedge for each of the 8 broad markets. The
population-weighted mean labor wedge is represented by a horizontal line.
market. To compute these quantities, we use the same procedure as above, except we now
compare firms within each market. For two randomly drawn firms in the same market, the
one with worse amenities can be expected to pay an additional 14 percent in order to convince
marginal workers (of average quality) to accept the job. This suggests that three-quarters of
compensating differentials reflect differences in amenities within markets.
6.3 Understanding the firm effects
Why is the inequality contribution from firm effects so small? To answer this question, it is
necessary to understand the economic determinants of the firm component of the AKM model.
As evident from equation (18) of Section 4.3, our structural wage equation reduces to the AKM
model if there are no production complementarities and every firm faces a perfectly elastic labor
supply curve. The structural wage equation would then be log additive in worker and firm
effects, with the size of the firm effects reflecting the heterogeneity in amenities across firms.
We find, however, evidence of upward sloping supply curves for labor, which generate a
positive relationship between the firm’s productivity and the wages it pays. As a result, the
size of the firm effects depends not only on the heterogeneity in firm amenities, but also on
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Figure 7: Compensating differentials
Notes: In this figure, we plot mean compensating differentials overall and within market. To do so, we
randomly draw a pair of firms (j, j′) with probability proportional to size. Each j′ is drawn from the full set of
firms when estimating overall compensating differentials and from the set of firms in the same market as j
when estimating within market compensating differentials. Then, we estimate the compensating differential
between j and j′ for a worker of given quality xi = x by ψj + xθj − ψj′ − xθj′ . This figure plots the mean
absolute value of the compensating differentials across deciles of the xi distribution, where the horizontal lines
denote means across the distribution of xi.






















covariance between amenities and TFP
These components can be broken down between and within broad markets (with broad market
being defined as the combination of sector times region). Within these broad markets, the
components can be decomposed further by looking within and between detailed markets (where
detailed market is defined as the combination of industry times commuting zone).
The results from these decompositions are reported in Table 8. They suggest a lot of variation
in amenities and productivity across firms. Interpreted in isolation, this heterogeneity predicts
a large inequality contribution from firm effects. However, productive firms tend to have good
amenities, which act as compensating differentials and push wages down in productive firms.
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Between Broad Markets Within Broad Markets
Between Within
Detailed Markets Detailed Markets
Total 0.4% 2.0% 3.1%
Decomposition:
Amenity Differences 15.9% 7.8% 7.1%
TFP Differences 15.5% 11.9% 8.6%
Amenity-TFP Covariance -31.1% -17.7% -12.6%
Table 8: Decomposition of the Variation in Firm Premiums
Notes: This table displays our estimates of the decomposition of time-varying firm premium variation in three
levels: variation between broad markets, between detailed markets (within broad markets), and between firms
(within detailed markets). Broad markets are defined as the combination of sector times region, and detailed
markets are defined as the combination of industry times commuting zone. We decompose the variation in
time-varying firm premiums into the contributions from amenity differences, TFP differences, and the
covariance between amenity and TFP differences. All variances are expressed as shares of log earnings variance.
As a result, firm effects explain only a few percent of the overall variation in log earnings.
For example, firm effects within detailed markets explain 3.1 percent of the variation in log
earnings, which is much less than predicted by the variances of firm productivity (8.6 percent)
and amenities (7.1 percent).
6.4 Determinants of worker sorting
There are several possible reasons why better workers are overrepresented in higher paying firms.
One possible reason is that productive firms have better amenities, and high wage workers may
value amenities more than low wage workers. Another possible reason is complementarities in
production, which incentivizes better workers to sort into productive firms. We now perform
counterfactuals that help quantify the importance of these distinct reasons for sorting in terms
of the correlation between worker and firm effects (i.e. Corr(xi, ψj(i,t))) and the inequality
contribution from worker sorting (i.e. 2Cov(xi, ψj(i,t))) .
In the counterfactuals we consider, we first reduce the heterogeneity across firms in amenities
or production complementarities by replacing either gj(x) with (1− s) gj(x) + sg¯j or θj with
(1− s) θj + sθ¯, where g¯j = Ex [gj(x)], θ¯ = E [θj ]. Here, s ∈ [0, 1] is the shrink rate with s = 0
corresponding to the baseline model. By reducing the heterogeneity in production complemen-
tarities, we are effectively making amenities more important for the allocation of workers to
firm (and vice versa). Once we have chosen the counterfactual values of gj(x) or θj , we solve
for the allocation of workers to firms. Keeping the wages fixed at baseline values (s = 0), we
then compute Corr(xi, ψj(i,t)) and 2Cov(xi, ψj(i,t)) at the counterfactual allocation of workers
to firms.
Figure 8 illustrates the importance of amenities versus production complementarities for the
sorting of workers to firms. In this figure, we report the quality of the workforce by firm type in
the baseline economy with s = 0 (subfigure a) and the counterfactual economies with s = 12 for
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(c) Shrink θj
Figure 8: Actual and counterfactual composition of the workforce by firm types
Notes: In this figure, we reduce the heterogeneity across firms in amenities or production complementarities by
replacing either gj(x) with (1− s) gj(x) + sg¯j or θj with (1− s) θj + sθ¯, where g¯j = Ex [gj(x)], θ¯ = E [θj ]. Here,
s ∈ [0, 1] is the shrink rate with s = 0 corresponding to the baseline model. We report the quality of the
workforce by firm type in the baseline economy with s = 0 (subfigure a) and the counterfactual economies with
s = 1
2
for either amenities (subfigure b) or production complementarities (subfigure c).
these counterfactuals are presented in Figure 8 and suggest that production complementarities
are the key reason why better workers are sorting into higher paying firms. Figure 9 complements
these results by plotting estimates of Corr(xi, ψj(i,t)) and 2Cov(xi, ψj(i,t)) for counterfactual
economies with different values of s. These findings indicate that production complementarities
are the driving force of the strong positive correlation between worker and firm effects and the
significant inequality contribution from worker sorting.
6.5 Progressive taxation and allocative efficiency
As shown in Section 4.4, the government can improve the allocation of workers to firms in
two ways. First, a less progressive tax system may reduce the misallocation that arise from
the tax wedge. Second, letting the tax rates vary across markets may improve allocation by
counteracting the differences in the wage setting power of firms. We now use the estimated



































































Figure 9: Worker sorting with counterfactual values of gj(x) and θj
Notes: In this figure, we reduce the heterogeneity across firms in amenities or production complementarities by
replacing either gj(x) with (1− s) gj(x) + sg¯j or θj with (1− s) θj + sθ¯, where g¯j = Ex [gj(x)], θ¯ = E [θj ]. Here,
s ∈ [0, 1] is the shrink rate with s = 0 corresponding to the baseline model. We report the share of log earnings
variance explained by sorting (subfigure a) and the sorting correlation (subfigure b).
equilibrium allocation and outcomes, including wages, output and welfare.
The counterfactual we consider involves two changes to the monopsonistic labor market.
First, we eliminate the tax wedge in the first order condition, which distorts the worker’s ranking
of firms in favor of those with better amenities. This is done by setting the tax progressivity
(1 − λ) equal to zero. Second, we remove the labor wedges in the first order conditions of the
firms. These wedges causes misallocation of workers across firms with different degree of wage
setting power. As proven in Online Appendix C.8, the labor wedges can be eliminated by setting
τr equal to the labor wedge 1 + ρrλβ in each market r. After changing these parameters of the
model, we solve for the new equilibrium allocation and outcomes, including wages, output and
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where φt is set so that profits and tax revenues are distributed among all the workers in pro-



















In other words, we redistribute profits and tax revenues in a non-distortionary way.
The result are presented in Table 9. They suggest the monopsonistic labor market creates
significant misallocation of workers to firms. Eliminating labor and tax wedges increase total
welfare by 5 percent and total output by 3 percent. We also find that removing these wedges
would increase the sorting of better workers to higher paying firms and lower the rents that
workers earn from ongoing employment relationships.
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(1) (2) Difference
Monopsonistic No Labor between
Labor Market or Tax Wedges (1) and (2)
Log of Expected Output logE[Yjt] 11.38 11.41 0.03
Total Welfare (log dollars) 12.16 12.21 0.05
Sorting Correlation Cor(ψjt, xi) 0.44 0.47 0.03
Labor Wedges 1 + ρrβλ 1.15 1.00 -0.15
Worker Rents (as share of earnings):
Firm-level ρrρr+βλ 13.3% 12.3% -1.0%
Market-level 11+βλ 18.0% 16.7% -1.3%
Table 9: Consequences for Worker Allocation and Outcomes of Eliminating Tax and Labor
Wedges
Notes: This table compares the monopsonistic labor market to a counterfactual economy which differs in two
ways. First, we eliminate the tax wedge in the first order condition by setting the tax progressivity (1− λ)
equal to zero. Second, we remove the labor wedges in the first order conditions of the firms by setting τr equal
to the labor wedge 1 + ρr
λβ
in each market r. After changing these parameters of the model, we solve for the
new equilibrium allocation and outcomes, including wages, output and welfare. Results are displayed for
output, welfare, the sorting correlation, the mean labor wedge, and worker rents.
7 Conclusion
The goal of our paper was to quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the U.S. labor
market by estimating the size of rents earned by American firms and workers from ongoing
employment relationships. To this end, we constructed a matched employer-employee panel
data set by combining the universe of U.S. business and worker tax records for the period
2001-2015. Using this panel data, we described several important features of the U.S. labor
market, including the magnitudes of firm-specific wage premiums, the sorting of workers to
firms, the production complementarities between high ability workers and productive firms, and
the pass through of firm and market shocks to workers’ wages. Guided by these empirical
results, we developed, identified and estimated a model of the labor market that allowed us
to draw inference about imperfect competition, compensating differentials and rent sharing.
We also used the model to quantify the relevance of non-wage job characteristics and imperfect
competition for inequality and tax policy, to assess the economic determinants of worker sorting,
and to offer a unifying explanation of key empirical features of the U.S. labor market.
When considering the interpretation and generality of our study, we emphasize a few caveats.
First, we focus on distortions in the allocation of workers to firms and markets. However, tax
and labor wedges may also distort the choices of whether and how much to work. Second,
our structural model makes several simplifying assumptions, partly to prove identification and
take the model to the data. For example, we model individual behavior, and hence do not
consider any interdependencies between spouses in the choices of whether and where to work.14
Moreover, we assume no mobility costs or search frictions, and we do not explicitly model human
14Autor et al. (2019) and Blundell et al. (2016) estimate a life cycle model with two earners jointly making
consumption and labor supply decisions. Their findings suggest an important role for consumption smoothing
through household labor supply.
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capital investments or wage growth over the life cycle. Third, ideally one would observe and be
able to exogenously change both the component of productivity that is specific to a firm and the
component of productivity that is common to all firms in such markets. Since we do not have
such an ideal experiment, we instead have to reply on the panel data. We show the assumptions
under which these data can be used to identify the parameters of interest, and we discuss how
some – but not all – these assumptions may be relaxed if one have access to instruments for
productivity at both the firm and the market level. Fourth, we consider an equilibrium where
each firm views itself as infinitesimal within the market. This assumption is motivated by the
fact that very few firms in the U.S. have a large share of the local labor market (as measured
by commuting zone). Thus, optimizing firms would essentially ignore the negligible effect of
changing their own wages on the overall supply of workers to the market as a whole.15 For these
(and other) reasons, our estimates should not be interpreted as a full accounting of the causes
and consequences of imperfect competition in the U.S. labor market.
15Atkeson and Burstein (2008) relax this assumption in the context of the product market. Berger et al. (2019)
adapts such an approach to modeling imperfect competition in the labor market, adding decreasing marginal
returns, capital and general equilibrium.
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For Online Publication
A Online Appendix: Data Sources and Sample Selection
All firm-level variables are constructed from annual business tax returns over the years 2001-
2015: C-Corporations (Form 1120), S-Corporations (Form 1120-S), and Partnerships (Form
1065). Worker-level variables are constructed from annual tax returns over the years 2001-2015:
Direct employees (Form W-2), independent contractors (Form 1099), and household income and
taxation (Form 1040).
Variable Definitions:
• Earnings: Reported on W-2 box 1 for each Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). Each
TIN is de-identified in our data.
• Gross Household Income: We define gross household income as the sum of taxable
wages and other income (line 22 on Form 1040) minus unemployment benefits (line 19
on Form 1040) minus taxable Social Security benefits (line 20a on Form 1040) plus tax-
exempt interest income (line 8b on Form 1040). We at times also consider this measure
when subtracting off Schedule D capital gains (line 13 on Form 1040).
• Federal Taxes on Household Income: This is given by the sum of two components.
The first component is the sum of FICA Social Security taxes (given by 0.0620 times
the minimum of the Social Security taxable earnings threshold, which varies by year, and
taxable FICA earnings, which are reported on Box 3 of Form W-2) and FICA Medicare
taxes (given by 0.0145 times Medicare earnings, which are reported on Box 5 of Form
W-2). The second component is the sum of the amount of taxes owed (the difference
between line 63 and line 74 on Form 1040, which is negative to indicate a refund) and the
taxes already paid or withheld (the sum of lines 64, 65, 70, and 71 on Form 1040).
• Net Household Income: We construct a measure of net household income as Gross
Household Income minus Federal Taxes on Household Income plus two types of benefits:
unemployment benefits (line 19 of Form 1040) and Social Security benefits (line 20a of
Form 1040).
• Employer: The Employer Identification Number (EIN) reported on W-2 for a given TIN.
Each EIN is de-identified in our data.
• Wage Bill: Sum of Earnings for a given EIN plus the sum of 1099-MISC, box 7 nonem-
ployee compensation for a given EIN in year t.
• Size: Number of FTE workers matched to an EIN in year t.
• NAICS Code: The NAICS code is reported on line 21 on Schedule K of Form 1120 for
C-corporations, line 2a Schedule B of Form 1120S for S-corporations, and Box A of form
1
1065 for partnerships. We consider the first two digits to be the industry. We code invalid
industries as missing.
• Commuting Zone: This is formed by mapping the ZIP code from the business filing
address of the EIN on Form 1120, 1120S, or 1065 to its commuting zone.
• Value Added: Line 3 of Form 1120 for C-Corporations, Form 1120S for S-Corporations,
and Form 1065 for partnerships. Line 3 is the difference between Revenues, reported on
Line 1c, and the Cost of Goods Sold, reported on Line 2. We replace non-positive value
added with missing values.
– For manufacturers (NAICS Codes beginning 31, 32, or 33) and miners (NAICS Codes
beginning 212), Line 3 is equal to Value Added minus Production Wages, defined
as wage compensation for workers directly involved in the production process, per
Schedule A, Line 3 instructions. If we had access to data from Form 1125-A, Line 3,
we could directly add back in these production wages to recover value added. Without
1125-A, Line 3, we construct a measure of Production Wages as the difference between
the Wage Bill and the Firm-reported Taxable Labor Compensation, defined below, as
these differ conceptually only due to the inclusion of production wages in the Wage
Bill.
• Value Added Net of Depreciation: Value Added minus Depreciation, where Depreci-
ation is reported on Line 20 on Form 1120 for C-corporations, Line 14 on Form 1120S for
S-corporations, and Line 16c on Form 1065 for partnerships.
• EBITD: We follow Kline et al. (2018a) in defining Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, and
Depreciation (EBITD) as the difference between total income and total deductions other
than interest and depreciation. Total income is reported on Line 11 on Form 1120 for
C-corporations, Line 1c on Form 1120S for S-corporations, and Line 1c on Form 1065 for
Partnerships. Total deductions other than interest and depreciation are computed as Line
27 minus Lines 18 and 20 on Form 1120 for C-corporations, Line 20 minus Lines 13 and
14 on Firm 1120S for S-corporations, and Line 21 minus Lines 15 and 16c on Form 1065
for partnerships.
• Operating Profits: We follow Kline et al. (2018a), who use a similar approach to Yagan
(2015), in defining Operating Profits as the sum of Lines 1c, 18, and 20, minus the sum of
Lines 2 and 27 on Form 1120 for C-corporations„ the sum of Lines 1c, 13, and 15, minus
the sum of Lines 2 and 20 on Form 1120S for S-corporations, and the sum of Lines 1c, 16,
and 16c, minus the sum of Lines 2 and 21 on Form 1065 for partnerships.
• Firm-reported Taxable Labor Compensation: This is the sum of compensation
of officers and salaries and wages, reported on Lines 12 and 13 on Form 1120 for C-
corporations, Lines 7 and 8 on Form 1120S for S-corporations, and Lines 9 and 10 on
Form 1065 for Partnerships.
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• Firm-reported Non-taxable Labor Compensation: This is the sum of employer
pension and employee benefit program contributions, reported on Lines 17 and 18 on
Form 1120 for C-corporations, Lines 17 and 18 on form 1120S for S-corporations, and
Lines 18 and 19 on Form 1065 for Partnerships.
• Multinational Firm: We define an EIN as a multinational in year t if it reports a non-
zero foreign tax credit on Schedule J, Part I, Line 5a of Form 1120 or Form 1118, Schedule
B, Part III, Line 6 of Form 1118 for a C-corporation in year t, or if it reports a positive
Total Foreign Taxes Amount on Schedule K, Line 16l of of Form 1065 for a partnership in
year t.
• Tenure: For a given TIN, we define tenure at the EIN as the number of prior years in
which the EIN was the highest-paying.
• Age and Sex: Age at t is the difference between t and birth year reported on Data
Master-1 (DM-1) from the Social Security Administration, and sex is the gender reported
on DM-1 (see for further details on the DM-1 link).
Goods Services All
Midwest Northeast South West Midwest Northeast South West All
Panel A. Full Sample
Observation Counts:
Number of FTE Worker-Years 42,908,008 26,699,951 40,312,311 31,585,748 69,044,540 62,386,621 103,227,384 71,355,046 447,519,609
Number of Unique FTE Workers 9,318,707 6,088,530 10,215,128 7,712,759 17,314,497 15,167,028 26,519,284 17,949,625 89,570,480
Number of Unique Firms with FTE Workers 294,879 232,717 439,641 329,566 1,051,548 1,054,944 1,908,178 1,314,168 6,478,231
Number of Unique Markets with FTE Workers 1,508 264 1,774 910 4,092 744 4,909 2,492 16,141
Group Counts:
Mean Number of FTE Workers per Firm 22.1 17.8 16.1 16.3 10.4 9.7 9.5 9.6 11.4
Mean Number of FTE Workers per Market 2,012.9 6,856.7 1,586.3 2,539.3 1,221.0 5,723.0 1,492.8 2,097.7 1,915.1
Mean Number of Firms per Market with FTE Workers 91.3 384.9 98.3 156.0 117.4 588.2 156.6 217.7 167.6
Outcome Variables in Log $:
Mean Log Wage for FTE Workers 10.76 10.81 10.70 10.81 10.61 10.74 10.62 10.70 10.69
Mean Value Added for FTE Workers 17.36 16.80 16.68 16.64 16.18 16.04 15.94 16.07 16.31
Firm Aggregates in $1,000:
Wage Bill per Worker 43.6 50.7 42.2 52.9 34.1 44.2 35.8 40.3 40.8
Value Added per Worker 91.2 107.5 85.2 91.7 90.5 111.1 94.2 92.3 95.2
Panel B. Movers Sample
Observation Counts:
Number of FTE Mover-Years 17,455,849 11,543,303 18,066,928 15,513,020 31,643,497 28,390,782 50,052,742 35,324,301 207,990,422
Number of Unique FTE Movers 4,124,895 2,829,881 4,819,645 3,876,182 7,723,804 6,662,132 11,904,098 8,321,469 32,070,390
Number of Unique Firms with FTE Movers 188,376 144,268 265,374 215,092 571,360 549,064 1,018,957 700,618 3,559,678
Number of Unique Markets with FTE Movers 1,457 261 1,747 872 3,899 739 4,766 2,342 15,586
Group Counts:
Mean Number of FTE Movers per Firm with FTE Movers 13.5 11.9 11.2 11.6 8.2 7.9 7.9 8.2 8.9
Mean Number of Movers per Market with FTE Movers 864.8 2,991.3 732.4 1,318.1 599.3 2,655.3 761.5 1,123.7 940.6
Mean Number of Firms per Market with FTE Movers 64.1 251.1 65.5 113.4 72.7 337.1 96.4 137.7 105.5
Outcome Variables in Log $:
Mean Log Wage for FTE Movers 10.68 10.77 10.64 10.78 10.59 10.72 10.61 10.70 10.67
Mean Value Added for FTE Movers 16.72 16.52 16.28 16.36 16.04 16.02 15.88 16.01 16.12
Panel C. Stayers Sample
Sample Counts:
Number of 8-year Worker-Firm Stayer Spells 2,588,628 1,777,928 1,237,821 1,150,115 2,315,238 2,527,212 2,609,997 2,207,552 16,506,865
Number of Unique FTE Stayers in Firms with 10 FTE Stayers 798,575 532,507 416,549 354,518 740,091 764,699 865,629 724,155 5,217,960
Number of Unique Firms with 10 FTE Stayers 13,884 10,896 9,409 9,767 18,083 19,475 19,626 16,185 117,698
Number of Unique Markets with 10 Firms with 10 FTE Stayers 197 111 216 104 335 213 438 219 1,826
Outcome Variables in Log $:
Mean Log Wage for FTE Stayers 10.95 10.99 10.97 10.99 10.90 11.01 10.96 11.05 10.97
Mean Log Value Added for FTE Stayers 18.04 17.56 17.46 16.56 17.45 17.23 17.89 17.93 17.61
Table A.1: Detailed sample characteristics
Notes: This table provides a detailed examination of the full sample, movers sample, and stayers sample.
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B Online Appendix: Key Features of the U.S. Labor Mar-
ket
B.1 Unconditional Moment condition





wit+τ − wit−τ ′ − γ
(
yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si] = 0 for τ ≥ 2, τ ′ ≥ 3,
where we defined Si = 1[j(i, 1) = ... = j(i, T ) = j(i)].
Proof. We start by expressing each of the terms ∆yj(i)t, wit+τ −wit−τ ′ and yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′
using the assumptions on the process presented in Section 3. We get that:
∆yjt = ujt + ξjt − ξjt−1 + δy (ξjt−1 − ξjt−2)
and
yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′ =
t+τ∑
d=t−τ ′+1
ujd + ξjt+τ − ξjt−τ ′ + δy (ξjt+τ−1 − ξjt−τ ′−1)
and finally
wi,t+τ − wi,t+τ ′ =
t+τ∑
d=t−τ ′+1
µid + γuj(i),d + νit+τ − νit−τ ′ + δw (νit+τ−1 − νit−τ ′−1) .
Taking the difference using γ, the second term in the product only contains transitory firm
shocks:
wit+τ − wit−τ ′ − γ
(





µid + νit+τ − νit−τ ′ + δw (νit+τ−1 − νit−τ ′−1)
− γ (ξjt+τ − ξjt−τ ′ + δy(ξjt+τ−1 − ξjt−τ ′−1)) .
The permanent firm shocks u˜jt and u¯jt cancelled each other. Finally, when multiplying by ∆yjt




















for d = t− τ ′ + 1, ..., t+ τ and d′ = t, t− 1, t− 2
As long as t + τ − 1 > t and t − τ ′ < t − 2 or in other words that τ ≥ 2 and τ ′ ≥ 3, all terms
will be equal to 0 thanks to Assumption 2.
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We also get E
[
ξj(i)dξj(i)d′ |Si = 1
]
which is zero by Assumption 1 when d 6= d′. The com-
bination d = d′ does not appear when τ ≥ 2 and τ ′ ≥ 3 and hence we also get that all terms





wit+τ − wit−τ ′ − γ
(
yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si] = 0.














Lemma 2. Under the assumption that VA growth is −δ or δ each with probability one half,
the pass-through parameters γ can be expressed as the ratio of two Difference in Differences as
follows:
γ =
E [wit+τ − wit−τ ′ |+δ, Si=1]− E [wit+τ − wit−τ ′ |−δ, Si=1]
E
[
yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′ |+δ, Si=1
]− E [yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′ |−δ, Si=1] .
Proof. We show in this section that γ can be written as the ratio of two difference-in-difference.
We start with the following expression for γ where we have shown in Lemma 1 that the denom-










yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′
) |Si=1] .
We rewrite the numerator under the assumption that the value added growth only takes 2 values
+δ and −δ, as if it was a binary instrument:
E
[
∆yj(i)t (wit+τ − wit−τ ′) |Si=1
]
= δ · Pr [∆yj(i)t = δ]E [wit+τ − wit−τ ′ |Si=1,∆yj(i)t = δ]












wit+τ − wit−τ ′ |Si=1,∆yj(i)t = −δ
]
.
















yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′ |Si=1,∆yj(i)t = −δ
]
.
giving the following final expression:
γ =
E [wit+τ − wit−τ ′ |+δ, Si=1]− E [wit+τ − wit−τ ′ |−δ, Si=1]
E
[
yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′ |+δ, Si=1
]− E [yj(i),t+τ − yj(i),t−τ ′ |−δ, Si=1] .
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The numerator is a difference-in-difference for earnings where the change between t − τ ′ and
t + τ is the first difference and the change between ∆yj(i)t = −δ and ∆yj(i)t = δ is the second
difference. The denominator is the same Diff-in-Diff applied to the firm value added.
B.3 Moment condition with market shocks





w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ − γ
(
y˜j(i),t+τ − y˜j(i),t−τ
)) |Si=1] = 0 for τ ≥ 2, τ ′ ≥ 3.
where w˜it = wit − E
[
wi′t | j(i′, t) ∈ Jr(j(i,t))
]
denotes wages net of market-time dummies.
Proof. As in Lemma 1 we express each of the three terms separately. The expression for ∆yjt
is identical and we can split the permanent shock into market and firm specific:
∆yjt = u˜jt + u¯r(j)t + ξjt − ξjt−1 + δy (ξjt−1 − ξjt−2)
Next we look at the difference in earnings:
w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ =
t+τ∑
d=t−τ ′+1










µid + γu˜j(i),d + νit+τ − νit−τ ′ + δw (νit+τ−1 − νit−τ ′−1)
where the expectation terms reduces to the common market shock since firm level permanent
innovations average to zero in the market by definition and that firm specific transitory shocks
average to zero by assumption. The market shock then cancel each other and the expression
reduces to
w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ =
t+τ∑
d=t−τ ′+1
µid + γu˜j(i),d + νit+τ − νit−τ ′ + δw (νit+τ−1 − νit−τ ′−1) .
Similarly we can express the value added term as
y˜j(i),t+τ − y˜j(i),t−τ =
t+τ∑
d=t−τ ′+1
u˜j(i),d + ξjt+τ − ξjt−τ ′ + δy (ξjt+τ−1 − ξjt−τ ′−1) .
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Combining the two gives:







µid + νit+τ − νit−τ ′ + δw (νit+τ−1 − νit−τ ′−1)
− γ (ξjt+τ − ξjt−τ ′ + δy (ξjt+τ−1 − ξjt−τ ′−1))
where the firm level shocks u˜jt canceled each other. For reasons identical to Lemma 1, as long





w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ − γ
(
y˜j(i),t+τ − y˜j(i),t−τ
)) |Si=1] = 0.
Note that one can instrument with either ∆yj(i)t or ∆y˜j(i)t since both include u˜jt.





w¯it+τ − w¯it−τ ′ − Υ
(
y¯j(i),t+τ − y¯j(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si=1] = 0
for τ ≥ 2, τ ′ ≥ 3
where w¯it = E
[
wi′t | j(i′, t) ∈ Jr(j(i,t))
]
.
Proof. Similar to the previous Lemma we start by expressing each term. At the market level
we get:









∆yjt = u˜jt + u¯r(j)t + ξjt − ξjt−1 + δy (ξjt−1 − ξjt−2) .
This gives rise to a similar but simpler approach. as long as τ ≥ 2, τ ′ ≥ 3, all interaction terms





w¯it+τ − w¯it−τ ′ − Υ
(
y¯j(i),t+τ − y¯j(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si=1] = 0.
Note that one can instrument with either ∆yj(i)t or ∆y¯j(i)t since both include u¯rt. Also note
that here we used the fact that the transitory shocks average out within market but we could
have relaxed that.
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B.4 Adjusted two-way fixed effect regression
Lemma 5. We show that
E[wit − γ(yj(i,t),t − yj(i,t),1)− (Υ − γ)
(
y¯r(i,t),t − y¯r(i,t),1
) |j(i, 1), ..., j(i, T )] = φij(i,t).
Proof. We assume that the initial conditions for the permanent component of earnings is wpi1 = 0
and hence we load the initial condition into the match effect φij . We then get that
wit = φij(i,t) +
t∑
τ=2
µiτ + γu˜j(i,t),τ + Υ u¯r(j(i,t)),τ + νi,t + δ
wνi,t−1
and similarly we get that




+ ξi,t − ξi,1 + δy (ξi,t−1 − ξi,0)
and by assumption on the transitory errors and firm specific innovation we get that








and bringing all together we get that
E[wit − γ(yj(i,t),t − yj(i,t),1)− (Υ − γ)
(
y¯r(i,t),t − y¯r(i,t),1
) |j(i, 1), ..., j(i, T )]
= φij(i,t) + E[ξi,t + δyξi,t−1 − ξi,1 − δyξi,0|j(i, 1), ..., j(i, T )]
= φij(i,t).
Using the average change at the firm and market level allows removing the time varying common
part at each time t. Using yj(i,t),1 allows removing the fixed effect ζj from the firms. In practice
one can use the average instead of the first value in time for yj(i,t),1 and y¯r(i,t),1.
B.5 Estimating the rest of the process parameters
We estimate the pass-through rates in two steps. First, we estimate the parameters for the value
added process. Second, we jointly estimate the pass-through parameters and the parameter of
the wage process for the worker.
For the value added process, we use a GMM approach where we put the full variance-
covariance in growth from a panel of 8-year spells for stayers. The matrix of moments uses the
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growth at t = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.1 This is in order to not use any data from the first (t = 1) and last
(t = 8) years of the spell. We do this because first and last years of a spell can be partial spells,
hence focusing on the middle alleviates the issue of not observing within-years dates for start
and end of job.
So we construct a 5 × 5 matrix My from the data where the (p, q) element is My(p, q) =
Cov(∆yip,∆yiq). We can construct the same moments matrix in the model as a function of
{δy, σu, σξ} which we denote M∗y (p, q; δy, σu, σξ).We use as a matrix the diagonal matrix with
variance implied by joint normality across the ∆yit. The weight associated with Cov(∆yip,∆yiq)
is then Wy(p, q) = Cov(∆yip,∆yiq)2 + V ar(∆yip)V ar(∆yiq).









M∗y (p, q; δ
y, σu, σξ)−My(p, q)
)2
.
In step 2 we construct two matrices each of size 5× 5:
Mw(p, q) = Cov(∆wip,∆wiq)
Mwy(p, q) = Cov(∆wip,∆yiq),
and we denote M∗w(p, q; δw, σµ, σν , γ, ζ) and M∗wy(p, q; δw, σµ, σν) as the matrices constructed
from the model. These matrices are also functions of (δy, σu, σξ) and we use the parameters
estimated in the first step. The weighting matrix is constructed in a similar way using diagonal
weights only and the joint normality assumption.
Ww(p, q) = Cov(∆wip,∆wiq)
2 + V ar(∆wip)V ar(∆wiq)
Wwy(p, q) = Cov(∆wip,∆yiq)
2 + V ar(∆wip)V ar(∆yiq)














w, σµ, σν , γ, ζ)−Mwy(p, q)
)2
.
In practice, all of these expressions are polynomials in the parameters. We solve the mini-
mization problem using global polynomial optimization as in Lasserre (2001). This allows us to
formally certify the global optimality of the solution.
For inference, we use a joint bootstrap of My,Mw,Myw. We computed the bootstrap by
resampling at the commuting zone by industry level, representing about 2000 clusters.
The main results are displayed in Online Appendix Table B.1. Additional heterogeneity and
robustness analyses are presented in Online Appendix Figure B.1.
1In the case of MA(1), one can also use t = 2, however we wanted to test for MA(2) as a robustness.
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GMM Estimates of Joint Process
Firm Only Accounting for Markets
Log Value Added Log Earnings Log Value Added Log Earnings
Panel A. Process: MA(1)
Total Growth (Std. Dev.) 0.31 0.17 0.29 0.16
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Permanent Shock (Std. Dev.) 0.20 0.10 0.17 0.10
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Transitory Shock (Std. Dev.) 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.10
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
MA Coefficient, Lag 1 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.15
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
MA Coefficient, Lag 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Permanent Passthrough Coefficient 0.14 0.13
(0.01) (0.01)
Transitory Passthrough Coefficient -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Market Passthrough Coefficient 0.18
(0.02)
Panel B. Process: MA(2)
Total Growth (Std. Dev.) 0.31 0.17 0.29 0.16
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Permanent Shock (Std. Dev.) 0.20 0.10 0.17 0.10
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Transitory Shock (Std. Dev.) 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.10
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
MA Coefficient, Lag 1 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.21
(0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
MA Coefficient, Lag 2 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.04
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Permanent Passthrough Coefficient 0.15 0.13
(0.01) (0.01)
Transitory Passthrough Coefficient -0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Market Passthrough Coefficient 0.18
(0.03)
Table B.1: GMM estimates of the earnings and value added processes
Notes: This table displays the parameters of the joint processes of log value added and log earnings. These
results come from joint estimation of the earnings and value added processes (3) and (4) using GMM. Columns
1-2 report results from the specification which imposes Υ = γ (“Firm only”), while columns 3-4 report results
from the specification which allows Υ to differ from γ (“Accounting for Markets”). The top panel assumes the
transitory components follow an MA(1) process. The bottom panel permits the transitory components to
follow an MA(2) process. Standard errors are estimated using 40 block bootstrap draws in which the block is























(b) Heterogeneity across Firms and Value Added Measures
Figure B.1: Heterogeneity in pass-through rates of firm shocks
Notes: This figure displays heterogeneity in the GMM estimates of the pass-through rates of a firm shock, both
for the firm only model (imposing Υ = γ) and when removing market by year means (permitting Υ 6= γ).
11
B.6 Mobility Bias and Firm and Worker Effect Estimation
Sample: Full Sample ≥ 2 Movers Connected Set
Workers in 2001-2008:
Worker-Years (Millions) 245.0 227.8 227.4
(100.0%) (93.0%) (92.8%)
Unique Workers (Millions) 66.2 61.8 61.7
(100.0%) (93.3%) (93.2%)
Workers in 2008-2015:
Worker-Years (Millions) 232.9 212.4 211.9
(100.0%) (91.2%) (91.0%)
Unique Workers (Millions) 64.0 58.8 58.6
(100.0%) (91.9%) (91.7%)
Table B.2: Floor on Number of Movers and the Connected Set
Notes: This table demonstrates the fraction of workers kept in the sample in the AKM and BLM analysis when
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(b) AKM Estimates of Firm Component
Figure B.2: Earnings Variance and AKM Estimates of Firm Component by Earnings Floor
Notes: In this figure, we report estimates of the variance of log earnings (subfigure a) and AKM estimates of
the firm component (subfigure b) when imposing different FTE wage floors. Literature abbreviations are BBDF
for Barth et al. (2016), SPGBvW for Song et al. (2018), Sorkin for Sorkin (2018), and LMS for the baseline
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Figure B.3: Event Study of Changes in Earnings when Workers Move Between Firms
Notes: In this figure, we classify firms into four equally sized groups based on the mean earnings of stayers in
the firm (with 1 and 4 being the group with the lowest and highest mean earnings, respectively). We then
compute mean log earnings for the workers that move between these groups of firms in the years before and
after the move. Note that the employer differs between event times -1 and 1, but we do not know exactly when
the change in employer occurred. Thus, to avoid concerns over workers exiting and entering employment during









10 20 30 40 50




















Figure B.4: BLM Decomposition by Number of Clusters












































































































































































































































































































































































































Midwest Northeast South West Midwest Northeast South West
Panel A. Model Parameters
Idyosinctratic taste parameter (β−1) 0.200
(0.044)
Taste correlation parameter (ρ) 0.844 0.694 0.719 0.924 0.649 0.563 0.744 0.619
(0.179) (0.153) (0.160) (0.182) (0.141) (0.109) (0.246) (0.117)
Returns to scale (1− α) 0.746 0.764 0.863 0.949 0.753 0.740 0.814 0.752
(0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.036) (0.015)
Panel B. Firm-level Rents and Rent Shares
Workers’ Rents:
Per-worker Dollars 6,802 6,681 5,737 8,906 4,234 4,847 5,009 4,805
(770) (723) (720) (867) (502) (803) (1,295) (684)
Share of Earnings 16% 13% 14% 17% 12% 11% 14% 12%
(2%) (1%) (2%) (2%) (1%) (2%) (4%) (2%)
Firms’ Rents:
Per-worker Dollars 4,041 4,198 7,465 20,069 3,531 3,097 6,915 3,018
(1,243) (1,130) (2,681) (6,323) (1,004) (1,305) (5,650) (1,060)
Share of Profits 8% 7% 17% 52% 6% 5% 12% 6%
(3%) (2%) (6%) (16%) (2%) (2%) (10%) (2%)
Workers’ Share of Rents 63% 61% 43% 31% 55% 61% 42% 61%
(4%) (4%) (5%) (4%) (4%) (5%) (9%) (5%)
Panel C. Market-level Rents and Rent Shares
Workers’ Rents:
Per-worker Dollars 7,837 9,102 7,572 9,506 6,115 7,935 6,422 7,230
(1,319) (1,532) (1,274) (1,600) (1,029) (1,335) (1,081) (1,217)
Share of Earnings 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%
(3%) (3%) (3%) (3%) (3%) (3%) (3%) (3%)
Firms’ Rents:
Per-worker Dollars 4,940 6,311 10,000 20,846 5,734 5,897 9,363 5,153
(1,140) (1,350) (2,267) (5,787) (1,351) (1,786) (4,218) (1,433)
Share of Profits 10% 11% 23% 54% 10% 9% 16% 10%
(2%) (2%) (5%) (15%) (2%) (3%) (7%) (3%)
Workers’ Share of Rents 61% 59% 43% 31% 52% 57% 41% 58%
(3%) (3%) (4%) (5%) (3%) (4%) (8%) (4%)
Table B.3: Market Heterogeneity in Model Parameters and Rent Sharing Estimates
Notes: This table displays heterogeneity in the estimated model parameters and rents. These results
correspond to the specification which allows Υ to differ from γ, and for ρr and αr to vary across broad markets.
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Figure B.6: Fit of the Tax Function
Notes: In this figure, we display the log net income predicted by the tax function compared to the log net
income observed in the data.
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C Online Appendix: Model of the Labor Market
C.1 Derivation of equilibrium wages
Given the nested Logit preferences and a given set of wages Wt = {Wjt(X,V )}j=1..J we get
that






































Lemma 6. Assume that firms believe they are strategically small. That is, in the firm first




We can then show that for firm j in market r,









Irt(X,V ) = V · Irt(X) (36)































Proof. We start from the firm problem specified in the main text including the tax parameters.
We have:
max






















































































Let’s then turn to the output of the firm,
Yjt/Ajt =
(∫∫
XθjV ·Krt(X,V ) (τGj(X))β/ρr Wjt(X,V )λβ/ρrdXdV
)1−αr
=



































= V · Irt(X).







, we replace the expression for the
wage to get:









= MV (V )Krt(X)V
−λβ/ρr .







































In addition we have
Ljt =
∫ ∫




























Lemma 7 (Uniqueness of Hjt). The firm and time-specific equilibrium constants Hjt are
uniquely defined.






































×Xθj(1+λβ/ρr) (τGj(X)Cλr )β/ρr MX(X)dX] 11+αrλβ/ρr ,
Where we replaced the Krt(X) and then Irt(X) and finally Wj(X,V ) with their definitions in
the expression for Hjt. To show uniqueness we are going to show that H˜jt ≡ (Hjt)αr is unique.





































×Xθj(1+λβ/ρr) (τGj(X)Cλr )β/ρr MX(X)dX] αr1+αrλβ/ρr
= Γjt( ~Ht)
We show that this expression satisfies the two conditions required to apply Theorem 1 of Kennan
21




















and we see that





















Hence we get that

























































Then, given ~Ht > 0 such that Γt( ~Ht) = ~Ht then for any 0 < µ < 1, any r and any j ∈ Jr, we
have
Γjt(µ · ~Ht)− µ · H˜jt = µ
αrλβ/ρr
1+αrλβ/ρr · Γjt( ~Ht)− µ · H˜jt
= µ
αrλβ/ρr








which means that we have shown that Γt( ~Ht)− ~Ht is strictly “radially quasi-concave”. The next
step is to show monotonicity. Consider ~H1t and ~H2t such that for a given j we have H˜1jt = H˜2jt
and H˜1j′t ≤ H˜2j′t for all other. Then we have that for all j′,t and X:
H˜1j′t ≤ H˜2j′t
22

























































































Combining the last two results gives us that
Γjt( ~H1t) ≤ Γjt( ~H2t)
The fact that the function is “radially quasi-concave” together with the monotonicity gives
uniqueness of the fixed point by the theorem in Kennan (2001). This means that ~Ht is unique,
and hence that H˜jt is unique and finally that Hjt is unique.
Definition 2. We consider a sequence of increasingly larger economies indexed by an increasing
nrwhere nfr = κrnr for some fixed κr. In this sequence of economies we assume that the amenities




for some fixed G˚j(X). We also assume that
the mass of workers grows according to N = nr · n¯f · N˚ .
Lemma 8. Here we establish that the unique solution for Hjt in the limit of a sequence of
growing economies is given by
























































































×Xθj(1+λβ/ρr) (τGj(X)Cλr )β/ρr NMX(X)dX] 11+αrλβ/ρr ,












































































































next we show that Hjt can indeed be expressed as stated in the lemma. Let’s assume that
24

























































































































































We can then establish the final result.
Proposition 1. The wage equation is given by



















(1 + αrλβ) (1 + αrλβ/ρr)
a¯rt + hj
hence we get





hj = `j(a¯ = 0, a˜ = 0)
Next, we replace the expression in the wage to get






= wj(x, v, a¯rt, a˜jt).
where we defined






Note that wjt(x, v) depends on time only through a¯rt and a˜jt.
Corollary 1. The firm demand is given by:









We also derive the other quantities of the model.
Corollary 2. The value added and wage bills are given by


























+ (1− αr)λβ/ρr (cr + ajt)
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and for the wage bill:
Bjt =
∫∫
W (X,V )Djt(X,V )dXdV
=
∫∫




















× (CrH−αj )λβ/ρr(j) (A˜jt) 1+λβ/ρr(j)1+λαr(j)β/ρr(j) A¯ 1+λβ/ρr(j)1+λαr(j)βrt dXdV






and so we get that
yj(a¯, a˜)− bj(a¯, a˜) = cr




· ∂ log a¯






· ∂ log a˜





Corollary 3. Firm j worker composition does not depend on a¯ and a˜.
Proof. Consider Pr[X|j, t]:













































Lemma 9. We establish that for workers of type (X,V ) working at firm j in market r at time
t, the average firm level rent is given by Wjt(X,V )1+λβ/ρr and the average market level rent is given by
Wjt(X,V )
1+λβ .
Proof. The average rents at the firm is defined as the difference between the worker’s willingness
to pay W and the wage they actually get at firm j at time t denoted Wjt(X,V ). The supply
curve Sjt(X,V,W ) exactly defines the number of people willing work at firm j at some given
wage W . Hence the density of willingness to pay among workers in firm j at time t at wage





and so we get the average value of the rent by taking the expectation with respect to that
density:



























where the second to last step relies on the definition of Sjt(X,V,W ) and the fact that we assume
the presence of many firms in each market to show that Sjt(X,V, ωW ) = ωλβ/ρrSjt(X,V,W ).
We can then take the average over (Xi, Vit) the workers in the firm j ∈ Jr at time t to get
E [Rwit | j(i, t) = j] = E
[





E [Wjt(Xi, Vit) | j(i, t) = j]
Next we want to compute the integral of the market level supply curve for each worker of type
(X,V ). In contrast to the worker rent at the firm level, we want to shift the wages of all firms
in the market for a given individual in a given market. This means that we want to shift both
the current firm j but also all other firms j′ in market r. Given the labor supply curve to a
firm j given by equation 33, we integrate by scaling all wages in market r by ω in [0, 1]. More







market r. The supply curve at firm j in this market as a function of the scaling ω is then given:
























where we also used the assumption that there are many markets in the first denominator. Hence








and by the same logic as as the firm level we get the following:





and we get that:
E [Rwmit | j(i, t) = j] = E
[





E [Wjt(Xi, Vit) | j(i, t) = j]
C.3 Firm-specific rent
Lemma 10. We establish that the firm rent is given by
Πjt −Πptjt =








Proof. In the following proof we abstract from V to keep the derivation simpler. The firm rent
is defined as the difference between the profit that firm would make if it were a price taker and







W ptjt (X) ·Dptjt (X)dX
taking the wage as given, and then equate with the supply equation. The first order condition
29
is








= W ptjt (X)
and the realized demand is given by:










where we use I(X)λβ =
∑
r Irt(X)
λβ , assumed constant due to the large number of markets.


































































































which we replace to get the wage






















































































































































C.4 Firms market rent
Lemma 11. We establish that the market level rents for firm j ∈ Jr is given by
Π−Πptm =






Proof. Here we consider the case where all firm in a given market are price taker. In this case






= W ptmjt (X)






































































































and we get a wage equation









and as in the usual equilibrium we are left with finding Hptmrt as a function of the market TFP
and amenities
Hptmjt =




























































Hjt . To see this we note that it
solves a very similar fixed point. Indeed
Hptmjt =























where Γ∗jt(·) is the operator defined in Lemma 7, equation 37 that defines Hjt as a fixed point.
For this operator we know that Γ∗jt( ~Hjt) = Hjt is the unique fixed point. The next step is to





Hptmjt , is a fixed















































and so we get that











































































We then go back and compute output and wage bills.



















































C.5 A model with capital and monopolistic competition in the prod-
uct market
We develop here a simple extension of the model with capital and monopolistic competition
in the product market. Without loss of generality, we derive the results here in the case of
homogenous labor.
Consider a firm with production function Q = AKρL1−α, access to a local monopolistic
market with revenue curve Y = Q1−, hiring labor from a local labor supply curve L(W ) = W β
and renting capital at price r. Profit is given by:
Q1− − LW − rK.
We first note that we can replace Q with the production function and get
(
AKρL1−α
)1− − LW − rK.
Hence, considering perfect or monopolistic competition in the product market give rise to the
same revenue function. We will focus directly on the revenue function parametrized as:
Y = AKρL1−α,
where ρ = ρ˜(1 − ) with ρ˜ being production and  being product market. We then have the
following Lagrangian for our problem:
AKρL1−α − LW − rK − µ(L−W β).








which we then replace in


































, α = 1+αρ1−ρ .
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C.6 Welfare
We start by defining a measure of welfare given a set of wages and tax parameters. As presented

















































To take into account changes in tax revenue and firm profit across counterfactuals, we redis-
tribute Πt and Rt to workers in the form of a non-distortionary payment proportional to net
wages, governed by φt. This means that each worker receives φtτWjt(X)λ in transfers. This
total transfer equates Π +R and is given by∫
φtτWjt(X)
λ ·Djt(X)dX = Πt +Rt
φtB
net = Πt +Rt
and hence

















































extra cost because paid proportionaly
C.7 Walrasian Equilibrium
We consider an equilibrium as defined by a set of wages W cjt(X) such that worker choose where
to work optimally given these wages, and firm choose labor demand optimally also taking these











































































































































next, defining Hcjt = Hcj A¯
(ρ−1)β/ρr
(1+αβ)(1+αβ/ρr) following a similar proof to the main proposition we
find that
wcj(x, v, a¯, a˜) = c



































which we can then replace to get the allocation to each firm given by























where we note that τ does not enter the allocation.
We first study the effect of market power on the allocation. This goes through the market
specific constant β/ρr1+β/ρr . In the case where ρ = ρr, the markdown only acts as an overall
economy markdown. This means it does not actually affect allocation. To see that, we note
that when ρ = ρr the fixed point for hj reduces to the fixed-point of h
p
j time a constant. Hence
we end up with only a scale in the equilibrium equation and no distortion in the MRS for workers
across firms.
In the case where ρr are not the same across regions, we end up with a wedge in the wage
equation. This creates in terms a wedge in the allocation. Correcting such miss-allocation can
be achieved by having region specific taxes τr set precisely to the inverse of the wedge. This
brings us back to the planner allocation.
We can also use the planner solution to evaluate the effect of tax-policies. The parameter
τ alone, does not creates a wedge on in the wedge equation, however it does not affect the
allocation as all options are equally affected.
C.8 Policy counterfactual
Lemma 12. Setting a tax policy to τr =
1+β/ρr
β/ρr
and λ = 1 achieves the competitive allocation
of workers to firms.
Proof. We plug in τr =
1+β/ρr
β/ρr
into the firm problem and show that it actually achieves the








































where we notice that τCλr always appear together and under this particular policy we get that
τrC
λ
r = (1 − αr) and hence the hj coincides exactly with hcj . This also applies to Ir0(X) and
I0(X). We then see that this implies that Dj(X) = Dcj(X). In other words such policy achieves
exactly the planner allocation.
D Model identification and estimation
D.1 Moment condition in the dynamic model
We now derive the estimating equations and show how to consistently estimate the parameters
of interest using a sample of workers that stay within the firm over time. The derivation follows
closely the derivations of Section 3 of the paper. We seek to establish that the following moment
40





w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ ′ − 1
1 + λβ/ρr
(
y˜j(i),t+τ − y˜j(i),t−τ ′





w¯it+τ − w¯it−τ ′ − 1
1 + λβ
(
y¯j(i),t+τ − y¯j(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si=1] = 0
for τ ≥ 2, τ ′ ≥ 3
which are the conditions of equation (6).
We start by looking at each quantity using the structure of the model.




u˜jt′ + ξj,t+τ − ξyj,t−τ ′ + δy
(
ξyj,t+τ−1 − ξyj,t−τ ′−1
)
w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ ′ =
t+τ∑
t′=t−τ ′+1
µit′ + vit+τ − vi,t−τ ′ + ξxi,t−τ ′ − ξxi,t+τ ′ + δx
(








and hence we get that for i such that Si=1
w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ ′ − 1
1 + λβ/ρr
(





ξyj,t+τ − ξyj,t−τ ′ + δy
(
ξyj,t+τ−1 − ξyj,t−τ ′−1
))
+ ξxi,t−τ ′ − ξxi,t+τ ′ + δx
(

















w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ ′ − γ
(
y˜j(i),t+τ − y˜j(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si=1].
The MA(1) measurement error in yjt is fully exogenous and doesn’t drive any decision as long














i,t−τ ′ − ξxi,t+τ ′ + δx
(
ξxi,t−τ ′−1 − ξxi,t+τ ′−1
)) |Si=1]
and given that the transitory worker shocks are also drawn iid and do not affect mobility decisions


















where we rely simply on the sequential independence assumption of Assumption 2: for t′ ≥ t,
µit′ is drawn independently of past u˜j(i),t and for t′ < t, u˜j(i),t is drawn independently of the





w˜it+τ − w˜it−τ ′ − 1
1 + λβ/ρr
(
y˜j(i),t+τ − y˜j(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si=1] = 0
A similar result can be established when replacing ∆y˜j(i),t with simply ∆yj(i),t. The derivation
of the second moment condition involving Υ follows from an identical derivation at the market
level. We get following the derivation of Lemma 4:















w¯it+τ − w¯it−τ ′ − 1
1 + λβ
(
y¯j(i),t+τ − y¯j(i),t−τ ′
)) |Si=1] = 0.
A similar result can be established when replacing ∆y¯j(i),t with simply ∆yj(i),t. Finally the fact
that 11+λβ/ρr and
1







D.2 Firm specific TFP ajt and amenities hj








∣∣∣∣ j(i, t)=jj ∈ Jr
]
.
We follow closely the steps of Online Appendix (B.4). We assume that the initial condition for
value added permanent component is u˜j1 = u¯r(j)1 = 0 and similarly for wages. We then get
that
















a¯rt + (1− αr)h¯r
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where we defined h¯r = E [hj | j ∈ Jr]. Given that the measurement error in yjt is mean 0 and








∣∣∣∣ j(i, t)=jj ∈ Jr
]
= θjxi + ψj ,
where we define
ψj ≡ cr − αrhj − λβ(ρr − 1)(1− αr)
(1 + λβ)(ρr + β)
h¯r.
D.3 Identification and estimation of Gj(X)
Lemma 13. We show that for all t, j ∈ Jr, r,X we have:
τ exp(λψjt)X
λθjGj(X) = (Pr[j(i, t) ∈ Jr |X])1/β (Pr[j(i, t) = j |X, j(i, t) ∈ Jr])ρr/β .
Proof. We have that:









































then we get that













λθjGj(X) = (Pr[j(i, t) ∈ Jr |X])1/β (Pr[j(i, t) = j |X, j(i, t) ∈ Jr])ρr/β
and since this is independent of the normalization, we get that this is true for all t.
Next we explain the estimation procedure that relies on the expression that we just derived.
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For estimation we are going to use a group structure both at the firm and at the market level.
For the firm grouping we use the one we obtained by classifying based on firm specific empirical
distribution of wages called k(j). We follow a similar structure at the market level and group
based on the market level empirical distribution of earnings. We denote such classification by
m(r). At this point we think of the firm class k(j) to be within market type m, hence when
using the classification for Section 3, we interact it with the market grouping.
Using these two classifications we are going to rely on the fact that worker composition can




Similarly to the Lemma we define Gj(X) = G¯rG˜jGk(j)(X). Following the lemma we impose




























Next we recover the j specific part by matching the size of each firm within its market:










And similarly we get the market level constant by matching the market level size:
Pr[j(i, t) ∈ Jr |X] = G¯βr
∫ (∑j′∈Jr (τG˜jGk(j)(X) exp(λψj′t)Xλθj′)β/ρr)ρr∑
r′
(∑
j′∈Jr′
(
τG¯r′G˜j′Gk(j′)(X) exp(λψj′t)X
λθj′
)β/ρr′)ρr′ NMX(X)dX
44
